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OHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Memory haa alwaya been a favorlte topl0 of reaearch, for it 
1. one of the moat preclous glfts nature haa given us. In the 
present the.l. this toplc 18 taken up again. Aa the title of the 
thesi. indlcates, it 1s a presentation of St. Thomaa t doctrine on 
sen •• memory. The que.tion to be anawered by the,th •• ia is slmply 
this: What d08. St. fboma. aay .ense memory is? 
There are two types ot memory in the teachlng. of St. 
Thom&s--intellectual and sen.e memory_ That there i. a memoratlTe 
power on the intellectual level is proved by St. Thoma. from a 
hi.torical fact which he take. from the Scrlptures. Dlscussing 
St. Paul's mystic experience of seeing God in rapture and ot 
afterwards remembering the vision, Aquinas conclude. that there i. 
a pure intellectual me.ory in man. l However, in the psychology at 
lRla argument i. a8 tollows: "Ad tertium dioendum quod 
Paulu., poatquam ceasavit videre Deum per e •• entla., .emor tult 
illorum quae in 111a visione cognoverat, per allquas .pecie. in-
telliglbile. habltualiter ex hoc in .lus intellectu rellctas, sicut 
etiam, abeunt. senaibili, remanent aliquae impreasione. in anima: 
qua. poatea convertens ad phantaamata,· memorabatur. Unde nee totao 
illam cognltionem aut cogitarepoterat, aut verbls exprimere." S.~~ 
II-II, 175, 4 ad 3. !he Bub.equent reterencea to the Summa will ie 
made to the edition with the Leonine text, ·edited wiUb note. and aD 
introduction by Petrus Oaramello. Taur1nl-Romae, 19$0. 
1 
2 
St. !noma. intellectual memory receive. only a secondary con-
sideration. Tne verf notion of memor,r includes some consciousness 
ot ttMe, or more precisely, of past time. Since pastness is 
associated with materIal conditiona, such as magnitude and dls-
tanc., tne knowledge ot the past properly belongs to the sensitive 
part ot the aoul,2 and consequently m.mory proper is sense memory, 
not intellectual. In the De Veri tate st. Thomas says: "Unde, cum 
- ............................... 
memoria secundum propriam sui acceptionem respiciat ad id quod est 
praeter1tum respectu hujus nunc: constat quod memoria, propria 
loquendo, non est in parte intellectiva, sed senaitiva tantum, ut 
Philosophus probat.") St. ~omast chief concern in dealing with 
memory, therefore, 1s not that memorative power which belongs to 
the intellectual part ot the soul, but that which belongs to senae. 
Accordingly, the main burden of this work is going to be the ex-
planation ot St. Thomas' concept of sense memory. The intellectual 
.emory will be mentioned only in so far as it will help to under-
stand better sense memory. 
Aa tar as it could be asoertained, no one haa undertaken a 
s1milar study on memory in St. Thomas. A number of authors have 
treated other internal senaes quIte extensively, but none of them 
2n[MJe.oria secundum commune. usus loquentium accipitur pro 
notitia praeteritorum. Cognoscere autem praeteritum utpraeteri-
tum, eat ejus eujus eat cognoscex-e praeaens ut praeaens, vel nunc 
ut nunc; hoc autem est sensus." De Ver~, 10, 2 c, S. Thomaa 
~,U1natiS Quaestiones Diaputatae,-ed:-W. Spiazzi at-al., 2 vola. 
( auriril-Romae, 1949), I, p. 194. 
)1!!!!. '!'he place in Aristotle is l2.!..!!!!. • .!! 1!!!!., 1, 4.50 a, 14 
) 
has written &Q1thing, a book or even an article, devoted ex-
clusively to the study or senae memo~. Some discusslon on tnis 
rorgotten senae can be found in works such as The Disoursive 
-
Power, .. by the Rev. George p. Klubertanz, S. J ., or The !2!!. .2! :.E!l!. 
"Sensus Communis" !!! the PSlcholoQ B.!.§!. 'l'homas Aquinas by the 
Rey. Edmund J. Ryan, C.PP.S. But there, too, sense memory is 
mentioned only in passing and in so rar as it helps to explain 
the matter at hand, i.e., the !!! ~ogitativa or the sensus 
communis. Brief expositions of St. Thomas' oonoept or sense 
memory can be tound in textbooks and works in general psychology. 
Tnese, as well as various commentaries on St. Thomas, suoh as 
Cajetan and John or st. Thomas, will be consulted and used in this 
study to point up or emphasize the implic1t thought in St. Thomas' 
own works. The chiet sources, however, 11'111 be the works ot St. 
Thomas himself. 
The method or procedure of the thesis will be exegetical. 
The texts ot st. Thomas will be atudied directly_ Tne explicit 
statements will be analy.ed and then turther developed in the 
light of other texts. The incidental rererenoes to sense memory 
will be used to throw further light on the truth contained in the 
direct statements on memory. The development of the thesis will 
follow the logical rather than the chronological order. There 
will be a need of making an occasional use ot the secondary 
sourc •• , but this w1l1 be done only to clarity and point up the 
primary sources. 
CHAPTER II 
MDORY AS AN INTERNAL SENSE 
Before saying what sense memory for St. Thomas is, it will be 
helpful to knQ" what it is not. The pt-oblemof specification of 
memory is the problem of distinguishing it ~om other internal 
senses, with whieb, as will be seen, it 1s closely connected. To 
understand the nature of memory, it 1s neoessary to study it first 
in its relationship to the other powers of internal sensation. 
For this purpose a somewhat detailed discussion of St. 
Thomas' own summary on the theory of the tour internal senses 11'111 
be helpful. In ~.l., I, 78, 4 0 he outlines the main points of 
his teaehings on the common sense, imagination, the estimative 
sense, and memory_ St. Thomas begins the article by stating the 
prinoiple of distinguishing the powers: H[C]um natura non de-
ficiat in neoessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animae sensitivae 
quat sutflclant ad vitam an1malis perfeot!. Et quaeoumque harum 
actionum non possunt reduci In unum principlum, requlrunt dl-
varsas potentias: cum potentia animae nihil allud sit quam proxl-
mum principium operationi. antmae."l This is a brief recapitula-
l~.!., I, 78, 4 c (init.); ct. also g.~. ~ ~., 13 c, ad. M. 
Caloaterra and T. S. Canti, in S~ Thama. Aquinatls -Quaestiones 
Disputatae, ed. R. Splazzi et ar., ~ Vola. (Taurfni-Romae, 1949), 
II, 329-30. 
5 
tion of what he has to say on the same point in the thlpd article 
of the preoeding question of.' the Su.mm.a.. There he states: 
{P]otentia, seoundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad 
acturn. Undo oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex aotu ad 
quem ordinatur: et per consequens oportet quod ratio poten-
tiae dlversi£icatur, ut dlversiflcatur ratio actus. Ratio 
autem actus diverslfioatur secundum diversam 1"ationem ob-
iecti. Omnis enlm actio vel est potentiae activae, vel 
passivae. Obleetum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae 
passivae, siout principlum et causa r.a.ovens: color onim In-
quantum movet visum, est prinolpium vlsionis. Ad actum 
autem potentiae activae comparatur obieot~~ ut terminus at 
finis: siout augmentatlvae virtutis obieotum est quantum 
perfectum, quod est finis augmenti. Ex his autcm duobus 
actio speoiem recipIt, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine 
seu termino: dlftert enlm calefactio ab Infrigidatlons, 
•• oundum quod haec quidem a calido, scilicet act1vo, ad 
ca11dumi ill a autem a frlg1do ad frigidum procedit. Unde 
neoesse est quod potentiae divera1t1centur secundum aotus 
at ob1ecta. 2 
Potencies, then, are determined proximately by their acts, ul-
timately by their objects. Potency~ as such, is ordered to act. 
Therefore, the nature of the potency is discovered from the nature 
of the act. The act, in its turn, is determined by the object 
with which it 15 concerned. 
Tho objeot is not anr objeot existing outside the knowing 
faculty, but an object in so far as it affects the cognoscitive 
power: "Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorlli~ diversl-
tleat potentias anilllas; sed differentia eius ad quod per ae poten-
tia 1"esp1oit."3 It is that part 01" that aspeot ot an objeot which 
8d. 
2S.T., I, 77, 3 c. 
- -
3Ibid. Cf. also In II De An., 6, nn. )04-307 (eap. 307), 
Ange 0 M. Pirotta.-'ra-e~ T!aurin1-Romae, 1948), pp. 78-79. 
6 
formally affects the faculty. Henoe, the name--the formal object. 
The distinction of' formal objects requires the distinct.ion of 
faculties, and therefore the distinction of internal senses ul-
timately must be based on the distinction of their formal objeots. 
What are the formal objects of eaoh of the internal senses? 
st. Thomas discusses this point in the subsequent paragraphs 
ot the same artiole. Fi~st he distlnguishes common sense and 
Imagination: 
Est autem oonsiderandum quod ad vitam an1ma118 perfeoti 
requirltur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentlam 
senslbl11s, sed etlam. apud 8ius absentiam. Alloquln, cum 
animalls motus et actio sequantur apprehensionom, non movere-
tur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; Guius contrarium 
apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae liIDventur motu 
processivo, moventur en1m. ad aliquid absena apprehensum. 
Oportet ergo quod animal pOI' uni~'1l sensi tivam non solu,,'u 
recipiat species .ensIbl1Ium, cum praesentialiter immutatur 
ab eis; sed st1am eas retlneat at oonservet. Recipc~e autem 
et retinere reducuntur incorpo~alibus ad diversa principia: 
nam hwnida bene reoipill.t."1t, ot male retinent; e contral'10 
autem est de siccia. Uode, oum potentia sensitiva sit actus 
organ1 corpora11s, oportct esse aliau1 potentiam quae re-
oiplat species sensibI11um, etquae oonservet. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • SIc ergo ad receptlonem tormarum sens1b111um ordinatur 
sensus Ero2rluD at communis: de quorum distinctione post 
a!ce£ur. -Xd harum autem formarum retantionem aut con-
servatlonem ordlnatur ¥hantasia, sive i1nasinatio, quae idem 
aunt: est enim phantas a sIve lmaglnatlo quasI thesaurus 
quldam formarum per sensum acoeptarum.4 
We find tha.t higher animals are capable of receivlng sense im-
pressions such as hard, sweet, white. This is the task of the 
external senses which receive the impressions according to their 
4~.!., I, 78, 4 o. 
7 
own formal objects, and of the common sense whioh distinguishes 
between the different senslb1es and knows the operations of' the 
external senses. From observation it is evident that animals 
know objects not only when they are present to the senses, but 
also when they are absent, for they go out in searoh of such ob-
jects. The sensitive soul of the animal must, therefore, be able 
not only to receive the sensible species, but also to retain them 
once they have been reoeived. The power of reoept10n is distinct 
from the power of retention, for the senses belong to the realm 
of material things where to receive and to retain are based on 
different px-inoiples. For instanoe, what is damp reoeives well, 
but retains poorly; what is dry, on the contrary, reoeives poorly, 
but retains well. Therefore, as regards the reoeption and re-
tention of sensible forms, we must assume two different powers in 
the sensitive soul ot an animal. The power ot reoeption is the 
sensus communis (and the external senses). and the power of re-
_ r 
tention 1s imagination or phantasy. 
Having diacu •• ad the distinotion of the oommon sense and 
imagination, St_ Thomas moves on to oonsider the other two oor-
relative senses--the estimative sense and memory_ Of these he 
sa,.s: 
(8]i an1m.al moveretur solum propter delectabile et oontrista-
bile seoundum sensum, non asset neoessarium pon~re in animali 
nlsi apprehensionem formarum qual perolpit sensus, in qui bus 
delaotatur aut harrat. Sed neoessarium est animali ut 
quaerat aliqua vel fuglat, non solum quae aunt oonvenientla 
vel non oonveniantia ad santlendum, sed et1am p~opter a11-
qua. alias oommoditates at utilltates, sive nooumenta: 
siout ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter In-
8 
decentiam coloris vel figUrae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; 
at similiter avis colllgit i)paleam, non quia delectet sensum, 
sed quIa est utilis ad nid_tlc$ndum. Necessarium est ergo 
animali quod peroipiat hUil:0dl intentiones quas non per-
cipit sensus exterior. Et , ius peroeptionis oportet esse 
aliquod aliud prinolplum: 0 . peroeptio tormarum senslbll!um 
sit ex immutatione s.nslbI1~sJ non autem peroeptio inten-
tionum praediotarum. \ 1 • • 
\. \ 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • i. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non 
acoipiuntur, ordlnatur vis "1tIlilE+tiva. -Ad oonservandum 
autem eas, vis memoratlva, que es\tthesaurus quidam huius-
modI Intentionum. C:u!us sIgnUm. es~, quod principIwu memol'-
and! tit in anlmallbus ex allqua hu~usmodi intentione, puta 
quod est noeivum vel eonvenlen~. E'Ii, ipsa ratio praeterIti, 
quam att~ndit memoria, inter ~~usmo~l intentiones co~ 
putatur.;;I :i 'I, \ 
J \ 
From experience we know that animals reaot tQ oertain situations 
:1' '" 
, , 
1n suoh a way as to indioate that FlU"Y' ~ave mo~e than just sensory 
I'! \, 
cognition. There is instinotive lrJ.howled~ in ~\an1mal by which 
it knows that an objeot is good or harmful fol' i~'~ This kind ot 
knowledge is not perceived by the iexternal \senses. A sheep flees 
a wolt regardless it it is brown o~ blaok. ~'lhe animals must be 
l \\ 
oonsoious ot something over and ablq,ve what th~,Y perceive by theil' 
1 \ \ 
external senses, 'lh1s "something": \is oal1er b1' st. Thomas inten-
tiones or intentiones insensatae. I 
P f 
Since these "intentions" are nc)it oaused dire~~ly by what is 
" 
, . . 
properly sensible and henoe no phantasm oOl'responcl~ng to them is 
! \ 
produoed either in the external se.ses or in the o~on sense or 
I I 
:,\ ' I 
the imagination, their presenoe i~/.n animal requir\e$ a distinct 
, \\ I 













oalled the estimative sense. 
But the intentions must be retained after they have been 
reoeived. Receiving and retaining belong to different prinoiples} 
therefore there must be another interior sense whose function 
would be to retain the intentions of the estimative sense. Th1s 
interior senae is called memory. 
Memory 1s a complementary sense to the !!! aestimatlva, just 
as imagination is complementary to common sense. st. Thomas 
oalls the imagination the treasury of forms, and memory the 
treasury of intentions. 
The common sense and imagination are conoerned with the 
forms of sensible things. The common sense receives them, the 
imagination retains them. The notion ot receiving, as opposed to 
J.1'etalning, implies that the objeot is present to the sense when 
it 1s received. The oommon sense, then, operates only when the 
forms are presented to it by the external senses. Its concern 
is with the sensible forms as present.6 
The object oeales to be "received" and begins to be 
"retatned" as aoon aa it beoomes absent to the external senses. 
The imagination retains the original impressions when the objeot 
is no longer present to the perceIvIng consoiousness. The formal 
object 01 the imaginatIon, therefore, is the sensible forms as 




The same distinction of formal objeots holds also for the 
estimative sense and memory. The formal objeot of the former is 
the intentions as present, and of the latter the intentions as 
absent. The insensate forma are evoked in animal oonsoiousness 
when useful or harmful things are aotually stimulating the aenses, 
that ls, when they are present. The funotion of sense memory, on 
the other hand, is to retain these insensate torma, when the ob-
jeot 1s absent. "[Clum de ratione memorias sit conserval's species 
rerum quae actu non apprehenduntur.n8 
The distinction of faoulties aooording to the dlfferenoe of 
the presenoe or ahsenoe of the objeot requires a little further 
explanation. Is the presenoe or absence of an object a real 
formality. sufflcient to justify the real distinotion of the 
powers of the soul. or 1s it not? To this St. Thomas has a ready 
answer. In the tollowing statement St. Thomas speaks of the ob-
jeot of memory whioh is the past, not merely absent. Henoe, the 
question is: Do the past and the present differentiate the 
powers? In the Summa St. Thomas says: 
I I 
"[P)raeteritum et prae-
sens possunt esse proprle differentiae potent1arum sensitivarum 
7Ibid. ct. also Robert Brennan, O.P., "The Thomistio Concept 
of ImagInation;" The New Soholasticism, XV (1941), 157, where he 
says: "It, then,~e-rorma! objeot or common sense is the sen-
sible ~ua present, the formal object of imaginal power is the 
senaih e ~ua absent." . 
8s •T., I, 79. 6 o. 
--
11 
div.rsiticativae; non autem potentiarum intelleotivarum. ff9 The 
characterisation ot objects as "past" and "present" is valid tor 
the distinction ot the faculties of sense, but not valid for the 
distinction of the taculties ot the intellect. It may be asked, 
why? John ot St. Thomas commenting on the passage says: 
• • • [Rlation.m 2raeteriti et 2raesentis ex parte obi.oti 
posse dlstinguere potentIas apprehenslvas materiales, non 
vero potentiam Intelleotivam, eo quod ista ex suo genere 
et proprla ratione obieQtiva abstrahit a oonditionibus 
materialibus at resp101t res 1n universali. Unde modus 
praeteritl vel praesentIs, qui sunt modi singularitatls, 
non po.aunt varlare potentiam Intellectivam, bene tamen 
potentiam sensitlvam, quae versatur ciroa singularia seoun-
dum Immutatlonem, qua ab obiecto Imm.utatur potentia et 
trahuntur res ad Ipsam. Unde quod Ista mutatio pendeat a 
praesentla senaibil1 et singularl ipslus obiecti vel ab 
11la abstrahat et independenter ab illa moveat, dlversum 
modum abf8ract1orem ponit in ipsa immutatlone et motione 
obiect.1. 
The intellect abstracts from the material conditIons ot singulars. 
It knows the essences of things which are always the same, uni-
versal. Absenoe or presenoe of an objeot does not affect the 
understanding in knowing its essence, tor it is not limited by 
the here-and-now oonditions by whioh the sensibility is limited. 
Sense knowledge is of singulars and 1s dependent on their action. 
Hence, they must be present to the sense, in order to be known by 
them. In his commentary on the B! ~ensu !1 Sensa to, St. Thomas 
aaya: "[Slenaus antem est singularium quae sunt hie at nunc. Et 
, . , 
9Ibid., I, 79, 7 ad 2. 
-
lOJoannea a Sancto Thoma, O~P., Cursus PhilOSO~h10US Thom!s-
ticna, Phil. Nat. P. IV, Q. VIII. art:-lIYT e~. P.eatus ReIser, 
o.s.B. (Taurlni, 1937), New ad., III, 260.-
12 
ideo secundum suam prop~iam ~ationem non est cognosoitivus nisi 
praesentium. hll Properly speaking, aense knows the present. But 
it it knows something absent or past, it must be moved by a prin-
ciple whioh is independent ot the presence ot the object, and as 
such dIverse trom that which is dependent. Presenoe and abaence 
ot the objeot requIres, then, a diverse moving principle, and 
therefore the differentiation of sense powers according to the 
presence or absence ot the objeot must be valId. As the dis-
tinction between the two moving p~inciples is real, the dIs-
tinction ot the faoulties must be real, too. 
And so, st. Thomas conoludes the article of the Summa on the 
distinotion ot the internal senses, stating: "Et a10 non est 
necesse ponere nisi quatuo~ vires interiorss sensitlvae partis: 
scilioet sensum oommunem et imag1nationem, aestimativam et memor-
atlvam. h12 These are the four internal sense. Which are requitted 
tor the perfect life ot a perfect animal. They are tteally dIs-
tinct from each other, because their formal objects are dist1nct. 
Although the interior sens.s are really distinct, neverthe-
less, they are closely related to each other. It was already 
pointed out that oommon sense and imagination, the estimative 
llIn De Sensu et Sensato, 1. n. 11; S. Thomae Aqu1natis In 
Ar1.totaria-LIbras De Sensu et Sensato De-MemorIa et~emlnI.--­
oentIa Commentarlum;-ea. ft. spiazzl, O.P7 (Taurlnt:Romae, !949), 
]ra ea., p. 5. _ _ 
12S.T., I, 78, 4 c (ad tin.). 
--
1) 
aense and memory are complementary to each other. Imagination 
can be understood as a continuation ot the common sense; tor as 
the common sense pertecta the external senses, so the imagination 
perfeots and completes the operation of common sense. The es-
timative sense, although distinct from common senae and imagina-
tion, i8 dependent on them. The insensate intentions which the 
estimative sense perceives, are in the other senses fundamentally, 
for the estimative sense depends on common sense when the object 
1s present, and on the imagination when the object is absent. l ) 
The memorative prooess cannot be regarded in isolation 
either. There exists an intimate relationship between memory 
and other internal senses. Aristotle conslde~d memory and 
imagination as not really distinot powers. For him they were 
funct10ns of the common sense. The imagination was a function of 
the common sense, because it tollowed the total mutation of sense 
which began w1th proper sensibles and terminated at the common 
•• nse. Memory, thought Aristotle, belongs ger !! to the erimum 
aensitivum or theaenlus commun\s, because it is in tne part of 
the soul which knows luagn1tude and. time. And this, according to 
1)ttconting1t taman quod diversarum potentla.rum eat una quasi 
radix et orlgo allarum potentla.rum. quaX"Ulll actus actum. ipsius 
primae potentiae praesupponunt. sieut nutritlva cst quasi radix 
augmentatlvae et geneX"ativae potentiae, quarum utraque utitur 
nutrimento. Similiter autem sens •• communis est radix phantasiae 
at memor1ae; quae praesupponunt aotum sensus oommunis." In De 
Hem. et Rem.; 2, n. 322 (edIted with In De Sensu €It Sensato;--
iii nOte"'"Ir). - - -
Aristotle, is the common sense. 14 
St. Thomas abandons the teaching of Aristotle on this point 
to tollow Avicenna who had demonstrated that memory and imagina-
tion were two powers distInct trom the sensus communis: 
Posset autem. alicu1 vlderl quod ex hIs quae hic diountur, 
phantasia et memoria non sunt potentiae distinotae a sensu 
oommuni, sed aunt quaedam pasaiones 1psius. Sed Avlcenna 
rationabI1iter ostendit esse diversas Eotentlas. Cum 'enIm 
potent!ae sensitivae sin~tus oorporallum organorum, 
neoesse est ad diversas potentias pertlnere reoeptlonem 
tormarum sensibl11um quae pertlnet ad sensum, et oonser-
vationem. earum, quae pertlnet ad phantasiam slve imaginatio-
nom; slout in corporallbus videmus quod ad allud prinoiplum 
pertinet reoeptl0 at oonservatio: humida enim sunt bene re-
oaptiva, siooa aut.met dura bene oonservativa. SimilIter 
etiam ad allud prInoipium pertinet reolpere formam, et oon-
servare reoeptam per sensum at Intentionem aliquam per sen-
sum non apprehens&M, qu~ia aeat1mativa perciplt etiam in 
alil. an1malibu., vis autem memorativa retinet, culus est 
msmorarl rem non absolute, sed pro~t est in praeterito 
apprehenaa a sensu vel 1ntellectu. 5 
Aristotle arrived at the conolusion that memory was a funct~ 
14In D., Memoria et Reminiscenti. Aristotle says: It Now , one 
must cognize magnItude-ana motIon 6y'means of tne same faoulty by 
whioh one oognizes time {i.e., by thatwh!oh is also the facultY' 
of memory]. and the presentation [involved in such oognition] is 
an affection ot the sensus communis, Whence this follows, viz., 
that the cognition ot these objects (magnitude, motion, time] is . 
effected by the [said .enaus communis, i.e., the] primary tacultr 
ot perception. AcoordInily, memory'[not merely ot sens1ble, but) 
even ot intellectual objects involves a presentation: hence we 
may conolude that it belongs to the faoulty of intelligence only 
incidentally, while d1rectly and essentially it belongs to the 
primary taoul~1 ot sense-peroeption." De Memoria et Reminiscentia 
1 (4$0 a, 10-14), The Student's Oxford Aristotle, trans. and ed. 
w. D. Ross (London;-r9~~), Vof. j. [fhe~e are. no DlmWers tor the 
pages In thIs edt tionl. cr. In De Mem. at Rem., 2, n. 319: also 
Edmund Joseph Ryan, C.PP.S., !lielI2!! 'o.fth'i"'!'ensus Communis !!! ~3~ PsycholoQ .2!!!. Thomas AgUinas (-e-ariliigena, OhIo, 19:;:£), p. 
15rn De 14em. e~ Res., 2, n. 321. 
of the sensus cOtJ¥1lunls because he thought that time was a common 
sensible and was perceived by the sensus oommunis. It also should 
.. . . 
be remembered that the common sense in Aristotle's psyohology i8 
synonymous with the sensitive soul. 16 
This, however, can be interpreted oorrectly. Since the co~ 
mon sense is the root and origin of the imagination and of the 
memory (tor both presuppose and are dependent 1n their act1vity 
upon the act of the common sense), imagination and memory may be 
called eassiones of the oommon sense. But this does not prevent 
them from being distinct powers of the soul. By saying that 
memory i8 a modiflcation (2as810) of the first sensitIve power, 
its dependenoe upon sensation and Its relationship to it is shown~ 
but th1s does not mean that it 1s not a distinot power. 17 
The relationship of the common sense with memory having been 
discussed, the next point to be taken up 1s the relationship 
existing between memory and imagination. 
The.e two (imagination and memory) are alao distinct trom 
eaoh other, as it is proved in the §umma,. I, 78, 4. Yet because 
of the close sImilarity ot function, there can easily arise con-
tusion in an effort to d1atlngu1ab them. 
17S_Q. S! !s., 13 ad 18: -[olum potentiae animae 81nt pro-
prietates quaedam, per hoc quod dioitur memoria esse pass10 primi 
sensitlvl, non exoluditur quin memoria sit alia potentia a sensu; 
sed ostenditur ordo .ius ad sensum. d 
16 
As was shown above,18 Aristotle thought ~mory and imagina-
tion were merely modifications of the sensus oommunis and as such 
not really distinct from each other. That there is a olose oon-
neotion between memory and imagination is evident also from the 
fact that the images of memory over a period of time tend to de-
teriorate into the images of the imaginative power. And mere 
imaginings, trom having been told too otten, oome to be believed 
as historioal events 01' onets own past. Thus imagination may be 
talsely turned into memory. 
How does St. Thomas distinguish imagination trom memory? At 
this point the discussion of the differenoe of function could be 
introduoed, for, as was sald above, the confusion in trying to 
distinguish these two powers arises ohietly trom the olose simil 
ity 01' function. But as this problem shall be discussed in the 
ohapters on the funotions of memory, there is no need 01' going 
into it now. At this plaoe it oan be noted, however, that St. 
Thomas does distinguish them and holds that they are really dis-
tinct powers. The chiet reason for this distinction lies, of 
oourse, in the differenoe of their formal objects. The formal 
obJeot of imagination is sensible fo~s of absent objects, while 
that of memory is intentions of absent objects. The word "absent" 
18 a generio word. When mod1~1ng "intentions", it applies to 
time and can be specified to mean "past." For memory does not 
1801'. pp. 1,3 .. 15. 
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abstract the absent intentions from the relation of time, as does 
the imagination with the sensible forms, but reproduces them in a 
definite setting of past time: "Memory is a power that apprehends 
the past."19 
So far the distinction between memory and the common sense 
and between memory and 1magination has been discussed. A fe. 
words must be sald on the distinction ot the correlative powers ot 
the soul, the estimative sense and its treasury, the memory. The 
chief problem that needs consideration here, it seems, is the 
principle ot distinction. St. Thomas seems to distinguish these 
two faculties (just as he does with the other two closely related 
powers, the common sense and imagination) not by the diversity ot 
the tormal objects but by the different manners of operat1ng. 
In the article of the Summa, a part of which was reproduced 
1n the beginning of this chapter, St. Thomas lays down the prin-
ciple that operations which cannot be reduoed to one principle 
require distinct powers, since the power of the soul is nothing 
else than the prOXimate prinolple ot the operations ot the soul: 
"Et quaecumque harum ac tionum. non possunt reducl ln unum prin-
oipium, requirunt diversas potentias: cum potentia animae nihil 
aliud sit quam proslmum principium operationis an1mae. M20 But 
what is the nor.m to determine whether or not an action can be 
19s.T., III, 85, 4, ad 3. 
- -
20§_!., I, 78, 4 c (1n1t.). 
18 
~aduoad to one powa~? Prom what he says f~the~ in the same 
chapte~, it seems that the standard of distinguishing the powers 
of the soul is the natu~e ot the operation itself: "Recipere au-
vsm et retinere reduountur 1n corporallbus ad diversa principia: 
~am humida bene reolpiunt, at male retinent; e contrario autem est 
~e siocis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi cor-
poralis, opo~tet esse aliam potentiam quae reoipiat species sen-
sibilium, at quae conservet."21 Since to reoeive and to conserve 
cannot be reduced to one principle, these acts require diverse 
powers, the estimative sense and memory. Did St. Thomas abandon 
~is own principle that powers are 'distinguished by acts and acts 
PY objects?22 
Cajetan, commenting on the summa, I, 78, 4, says that st. 
rhomas is using here two principles of distinguishing the internal 
senses. One is the multiplication and diversifioation of opera-
tions aooord1ng to the needs of a perteet animal, the other 
according to the nature of the operations themselves: 
{P]onuntur duae radices distinguendl ao multIplicand! poten-
tias anlmae. Pr1ma est de multipllcations actionum: scill-
cet, tot oportet ponere actiones, Q.uot ad perfectam vitam 
animalis perfecti sufflciunt. Probatur: quia natura non de-
ficit in necessariIs; neo etiam abundat supertluis, quia 
nihIl otiose agit. --Secunda est de habItud1ne dlver.itatls 
aetionum ad diversitatem potentiae: scilIcet, actiones quae 
non possunt in unum reduc1 principium, exigunt diversas 
potentlas. Et probatur: quia potentia anlmae nihil aliud est 
quam prox1mum principium operatlonis ipslus animae. --Et 
2lS.T., I, 78, 4 c • 
...... - . 
22Ibld •• I, 77, 3 c; the passage was quoted on page 6. 
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sunt haa vera. radices, quia causas terwlt diversiticandi 
potentias, oum sint propter actus. 23 
Cajetan thinks that the manner of operating is a source (radix) 
ot the diversification of powers. The act of retaining is not the 
same as the act of receiving. Therefore, there must be two dis-
tinct powers to perform these acts.24 
Although St. Thomas does not say explicitly that the acts of 
receiving and retaining are further specified by their objects, 
nevertheless, when he speaks ot these operations, he does refer 
to their objects. Thus he says: "Est aut em considerandum quod 
23cajetanu8, "Commentarii Thomae de Vio Caietani" in Bancti 
Thomas A~ulnatis o~era Omnia lussu imPensaque Leonis XIII P.M. {ftomae, 882-), Vo. V (:i88Q), p. 257. 
24The rest ot Cajetan t s oommentary is as follows: "Dicit 
ergo, ex prima radice, quod in animali perfecto aunt duae actiones 
necessariae, soilicet non solum recipere, sed retinera. --Pro-
baturt quia oportet apprehendere rem non solum praesentem sed ab-
Bantam. Probatur duc.ndo ad impOBslbile: quIa aliter non appe-
taret et movetur ad abaens. Et tenet sequela: quia appetitus et 
motus animalis oognitionem sequitur. 
Ex seounda vero radioe, quod haec duo opera non aunt eiusdem 
oorporei principii. Probatur: quia bene recipere est humidi, bene 
retinere est sicci. --Et s10 sequitur prima conolus10 subservien$ 
conservativae virtutes aunt aliae a receptlvis. 
Delnde rursus ex prima radioe dicit: In animali perfeoto aunt 
necessariae duae actiones, soilicet non solum circa sensibilia ut 
sic, sed circa intentiones insensatas, ad commodum et utile suum 
Bpectantes. --Probatur: quIa animal non solum movetur propter 
delectabile aut trlstabile secundum sensum, sed propter commodum 
et utile suum. Probatur quoad tristabile, in fuga ovis respactu 
lupl: quoad delactabl1e vera, in collectione paleae hirundinis in 
respectu ad constructlonem nidi. 
Ex seounda vero radice, quod hae aotiones non eiusdem aunt 
prinoipii. Probatur ex diversitate Immutativorum: quia scilicet 
ad illam. immutat sensibile exterlus; ad hanc non, sed interius. -
~Et sio sequitur seounda praeambula concluslo: Potentiae versan-
tes oirca intentiones insensatas, sunt aliae a respicientibus sen-
sata. tt Ibid. 
-
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ad v1tam anlmalls perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat 
rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud sius absentiam. • • 
Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum reoipiat 
species senslb11ium cum praesentlallter immutatur ab els; sed 
etlam eas retineat at oonservet. H25 A perfect animal must be able 
to apprehend an object not only when it 1s present to its senses, 
but also when it is absent. Therefore, continuos st. Thomas, it 
must be able to receive the impressions when the object actually 
affects its faoulties, i.e., when it 1s prosent, and also to !!-
tain them when it no longer affeots them, i.e., when it is absent. 
-
The act of receiving is oonjoined here with the presence of the 
object, and the aat ot retaining and conserving is conjoined with 
the absence of the objeot. This may be taken as an indioation 
that the correlative internal senses Which are distinguished by 
st. Thomas in the present article by their manner of operating, 
areulttmately distinguished by their formal objeots. 
In confirmation ot this conjecture, the following considera-
tion may be offered. In the De Veri tate St. Thomas says that the 
........ I. 
genera ot the powors of the soul are doubly distinguished: (1) on 
the part of 'the object; (2) on the part ot the subjeot or the 
manner of operating.26 But it may be asked, what is tho cause ot 
the diversity in the ma~~er of operating? Is it the nature of the 
25 8 4 ( ) S.T., I, 7, c init •• 
- -2f )De.Ver., 10, 1, ad 2. 
--
faculty itself', If it is, it may be further asked, as to the 
cause of its being of such a nature. Mlat has determined the 
21 
.faculty to be of this partioular nature? Has it determined it-
self to act in a certain way? It has not, for it is the end for 
which the power exists that determines its nature. So, the end 
must be taken into consideration. To what end is a power dLPecte~ 
A power, being a potency, of its very nature 1s direoted to its 
act. But the act, according to the prinoiple laid down in the 
Swama, 1s diversitied aocording to the diverse character of the 
objeot to which it is direoted: n(P}otenti&, seoundum illud quod 
est potentia, ordinatur ad aotum. Unde oportet rationem poten-
tiae acoipi ex aotu ad quem oX'dinatur: et per oonsequens oportet 
~uOd ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut dlveralficatur ratio ao-
tUS. Ratio autem actus dlversiticatur secundum diversam rationem 
DoJectl. n27 Therefore, though the manner of operation may diver-
sify powers, ultimately all diversification ot operation is de-
pendent upon diverse objects. 
Since, as was shown above, the charaoterization of objeots 
~s "present" and "absent" is valid for the real distinction of 
Clle faculties of sense, the conclusion that the correlative in-
~ernal senses are really distinot trom eaoh other seems to be 
~stablished. The act ot reoeiving of the estimative sense (and 
pf the common sense) does not have the same object as the act ot 
27s.T., I, 77, 3 c. 
- -
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retaining of memory (and of imagination), and therefore they are 
distinct powers of the soul. 
As a oonclusion to the present chapter, it can be stated 
that sense memory for St. Thomas 1s a really distinot internal 
sense, which means that it is not the common sense; the imagina-
tion, or the estimative sense. This, of oourse, is a nagativo 
approaoh. It must be supplemented by the positive exposition ot 
the matter. The problem or speoifioation ot memory still requires 
extensive investigation. The next chapter will attempt to deter-
mine more fully its p~per object. 
CHAPTER III 
THE OBJECT OF SENSE MEMORY 
Since a power is known through referenoe to its aot, and the 
act i8 specified by its objeot,l the problem ot speoificationof a 
taculty involves not only its distinction from other faculties but 
also the determination of its proper object and its proper funo-
tions. In the previous ohapter the distinction ot sense memory 
trom other internal senses was singled out tor discussion. The 
purpose ot this chapter is to tind its proper object. 
What, according to st. Thomas. is the proper object of sense 
memory? It must be reoalled that the proper object ot any faculty 
1s detined by st. Thomas as a formality 01' a material object by 
whioh the faculty perceives the object: "Propr1a autem 11lud 
asslgnatur oblectum. allculus potentiae vel habitus, sub oulus 
ratione omnia reteruntur ad potentiam vel habitum: s10ut homo at 
lapis reteruntur ad visum Inquantum sunt colorata, unde coloratum 
est proprlum oblectum v1sus. n2 This formalIty is an aspect ot a 
material object which makes it an object of the faculty. Under 
what formality doe. sense memory perceive the material object? 
lDe Ver •• 15. 2 c (lnlt.). 
--
2S• T., I, 1, 7 c. 
--
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It can be said right trom the start that St. Thomas seems to 
assign two proper objects to sense m6mory. One is the intentions 
of the estimative sense, the other simply anything past. In the 
Summa St. Thomas says that the memorative power is a faoulty which 
retains the intentions apprehended by the estimative sense: "Ad 
apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non acclpiuntur, 
ord1natur vis aestimatlva. --Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memor-
ativ., quae est thesaurus quidam huluamodl Intentionum."3 And 
aga1n 1n B! Veri tate: "(M)emorla quae oommunis est nobis at brutis, 
est 111a in qua oonservantur partioulares intentiones."4 In other 
places, however, St. Thomas says somethIng different. In the 
Summa we find these words: U[M]emorla est vis apprehensiva prae-, 
terlti."5 And again: "{P]raeteritum est proprium obiectum memori-
ae. ft6 The proper Object of sense memory, according to this 
passage, is something past. 
Since for St. Thomas sense memory is one faculty and not two, 
it may be rightly asked, whioh of the two is its proper obJeot? 
Is it the intentions apprehended by the estimative sense, or is it 
something past as past? 
Just to elaborate on the problem a little more, it can be 
3~ld., I, 78, 4 c (paulo post med.). 
4De Ver., 10, 3 ad 1. 
--5a.T., III, 85, 4 ad 3. 
- -
6Ibid., III, 85, 4 ob. 3. 
-
pointed out that there is a historical background of influenoes 
which may have had something to do with the origin of this proble~ 
There were two philosophers who by their doctrine on the proper 
object of memory may have influenoed St. Thomas' own idea of that 
object. These philosophers were Aristotle and Avioenna. Aris-
totle said that the proper objeot of memory was something past. 
Avioenna, on the other hand, thought that it was the intentions 
ot the estimative sense. In De Memoria at Remlnlsoentia Aristotle 
_ _ ....... =;..;;.;;0,.. ........................ 
says: VAs already observed, there is no suoh thing as memory ot 
the present while present, tor the present is the object only ot 
peroeption, and the future, or expeotation, but the objeot ot 
memory is the past • ..,7 It is common usage to speak of those things 
whioh are reoalled by the memoratlve power as past. It is 1~ 
possible to remember the future, tor tuture is the objeot ot 
opinion or expeotation. Nor is there memory ot the present, tor 
it is only the sense peroeption that knows the present. No one 
would say that he remembers a whIte object at the moment he sees 
it. Memory is, therefore, ne1ther sense peroeption nor expeota-
tion. Since it is conditioned by a lapse of tim.e, its proper ob-
jeot 1s the past. 
St. Thomas, oommenting on this passage, says: ftOstend1t quod 
memoria est praeteritorum."8 Then a little further he says: 
7Arlstot1e. De Memoria et Reminisoentia, 1, 449 h, 25-28. 
....... .........- " 
8In De Mem. at Rem., 1, n. 307. 
----- ----.......- -------
"[E]jUs quod nunc apprehenditur, in ipso nunc non est memoria, 
ut dictum est, sed sensus quidem est praesentis, spes vero futuri, 
memoria vero praeteriti."9 That St. Thomas accepted Aristotle's 
doctrine 011 the proper object of memory as true is clear from the 
fact that he incorporated it into his works other than the co~ 
mentaries on Aristotle, such as the S~~a, where, as it was noted 
above, he affirms that memory is of the past. lO 
For the idea of intentions St. Thomas is indebted to the 
Arabian phl1r:-,,;,('pher, Avicenna. He h1.mself, while on the subject 
of intentions, rafers to Avicenna several times in his works. In 
the commentary on the first book of the Sentences he says: "[U]nde 
sum1tur hic pro msm.o.ria quae est potentia sensitivae pa:vtls, quae 
habet organum in postrema parte capitis, et est thesaurus inten-
tionum senslbl1ium cum sensu, non a sensu acceptorum Islol, ut 
dicit Av1cenna, lib. lli:. Anima, part. IV, cap. IV."ll For Avicenna 
the power whioh apprehends the intentions is the estimative sense, 
and that which retains them is the memory. In his De Anima he 
-
saysr "Thesaurus vero apprehendentis intentionem est virtus cus-
toditlva, cu1us locus est posterior paps cerebrl, at ideo cum con-
tlnglt 1ntirmitas corrumpltur Id culus proprlum est custodlre has 
., 
9Ibld., n" 309. 
-
lO!_!., I, 79, 6 0 (ad fin.). 
llIn I Sent., 3, 4, 1, a.d 2; ad. B. Mandonnet, O.P., (Pari-
ails, l~T,-r,p. 113. 
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intentlones; quae virtus vooatur etiwn memorlalls, et etlam re-
tinens. "12 14:emo:oy is the treasure house of intentions, 'whose 
proper function is to retain and to pre.serve them. St. Thomas 
makes use of Avioenuats doctrine of intentions, and when he deals 
with the subject of the proper object of memory, he expresses him-
self in terms very similar to those used by this Arabian philos-
opher. 
To oome baok to the original statement of the problem: what 
is the proper object of memory for St. Thomas? Is it the inten-
tions of the estimative sense, or is it anything past as past? 
Does St. Thomas give the answer to the problem? In the 
Summa there is a statement which may be of help to find a solu-
tion. In the artiole on the internal senses Aquinas says that 
the object of memory is the intentions of the oat1matlve sonse, 
and then he adds: "Et ipsa ratio praeterlt1, quam attendlt memoria, 
inter hulusmod1 intenttones computatur. 1t13 The memory is the 
power of' retalnir..g the intentions, but pastness, the very ratio 
. 
Eraeter1t1, is nothing else but one of such Intentions. 14 
12Av1oenna, De Anim$, pars IV, cap. 1; transcription from the 
Venioe edition or-rSoa by G. P. Klubertanz, S.J. (St. Louis, 1949), 
p. 84· 
l3§_!., I, 78, 4 0 (mad.). 
l4There are many meanings or intentIon In St. Thomas. On 
this cf. H. D. Simonin, O.P., "La .otion d t lntentio' dans ltoeuvre 
de S. Thomas d'Aquin, It Revue S!! SeIe,.nees Phi1osophIque~ et The~ 
logiques, XIX (1930), 44>-453; andIn!i4 Hayen, s;J., t i lnten-
tlonnei selon Saint Thomas, 2nd ad. (Pa.ls, 1954), pp. 4a:~!. 
. .~ . 
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Pastness, then, falls within the gene~al oategory of inten-
tions. Sinoe this is so, St. Thomas is not inoonsistent when he 
~efers to the proper object ot memory in two different ways; tor 
the object designated in one way falls within the scope of the 
object under the othe~ designation. Although it may be hope-
fully affirmed that this is the oorrect answer to the problem, yet 
it needs an explanation.. It must be shown how pastnesS is an in-
tention. For this purpose it will be necessary to oonsider St. 
Thomas' oonoept ot intentions. 
It must be noted that an adequate analysIs ot the nature ot 
intentions will be somewhat difficult to make. The reason tor 
this is the tact that st. Thomas does not have any detailed and 
comprehensive exposition of it in any of his works. perhaps he 
supposed his readers to be familia~ with the technioal meaning of 
intentions, and so he did not attempt any lengthy explanation ot 
them. The information about the nature and meaning of intentions 
must be obtained from brief passages and incidental remarks 
soattered over all h1s works. The most adequate statement about 
the 1ntentions ot the estimative sense is found, it seems, in the 
Summa, question 78, article 4. There st. Thom.as says: 
(S]1 animal moveretur solum propter delectabile at contrista-
bile secundum sensum, non asset necessarium ponere in animal! 
nisi appl'ehensionem form.arum quas percipit sensus, In quibus 
delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est anima11 ut 
quaerat aliqua vel tuglat, non solum quia sunt eonvenlentia 
vel non convenientla ad sentiendum, sed et1am propter aliquas 
commoditates .t utI11tates, sive nocumenta: siout ovis videns 
.lupum venientem tu.git, non pl"opter indecentiam coloris vel 
tlgurae, sed quas! 1.n1m1cum naturae; et similiter avis col-
llgit pal.am. non quia delectet sensum. sed quia est utili. 
ad nldifioandum. Necessa~lum est ergo animal1 quod peroiplat 
huiusl1l.od:t intentionos, quas non perclpi t sensus exterior. Et 
huiu. pe~ceptionis oportet ease al1quod a1iud prinoipium: cum 
perceptI0 formarum aens1bil1~ sit ex i~nutatipne sonsibilia, 
non autem perceptio intentionum praediotarum. ~ 
From observation we know that animals perceive not only forms whidl 
are reoeived through the external senses, but also intentions whlch 
are not so received. From the mode of aoting the animals show 
that they perceive utIlity or harmfulness of objects presented to 
them. Since these "advantages" do not cause any physical change 
in the organ of the external sense, they must be apprehended by 
some other sense faculty- distinct from the external sense. '1'his 
1s the estimative sense. 
In this passage st. Thomas detines iKtsntions baSically in 
~e~a ot their distinction trom the sensible torms. These forms 
are sensate in nature, 1.e., apprehended by the external senses; 
intentions are insensate, i.e., not apprehended by the external 
~enses. Intentions are not even dependent upon any partioular 
aenae quality_ No particular sound, color, eto., determines the 
~naenaate intention: the sheep experiences tear whether the wolt 
~s gray or brown, whether it howls or app~aches its victtm silent-
y. This indicates the peouliar oharaoter ot intentions. Sinoe 
~hey are not apprehended by the external senses and yet are sen-
~ib1e in nature, they are called sometimes sensible per accidens. 
rhis term reters to the taot that oognition of insensate 1nten-
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tions is not sensed ear ~ by any external sense. Ordinarily and 
perhaps more properly the intelligible is what is re£erred to as 
sensible Rer aooiden!, but st. Thomas adds to this oategory also 
the objeot o£ the estimative and disoursive powers.16 
It intentions are not perceived by the external senses, one 
may wonder, what role do the external senses play in their pro-
duotion? What is their oontribution? St. Thomas in the commen-
tary on the first book of the Sentenoes says that these intentions 
4 1 
are peroeived "cum sensu, non a sensu. ,,17 V~hat does this mean? 
Just as the intelleot cannot completely know the universal except 
against the background ot the material Singular, so the estimative 
power cannot apprehend the import, the bearing ot a ooncrete 
situation except against the background of sensate apprehension. 
A lamb experienoes fear only when the sensible to~ of a wolf is 
actually present to him. There is always need of a sensible sub-
stratum with whioh the intention 1s per-eeived. The sense data, 
therefore, must be present, but the apprehension of their "mean_ 
ing," or the intentiona, is not determined bY' Its sensible content. 
Dealing with this matter, John of St. Thomas makes a dist1nc-
t10n Which 1s to the pOint. He says: "[R)espondetur species in-
sensatas acaip! per sensus exteriores, non ut formaliter cogn1tas 
ab e1s, sed ut virtualiter contentas in 1psis rebus sensibilibus, 
16In II de An., 1), nne 395-.398 • 
............... -- ...... 
171n I Sent., 3, 4, 1 ad 2. 
---
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quas app~$hendunt. Res enim insensatae oontinentur et aocipiuntur 
ex senaatia, nee est neoease, quod omnla. quae oognoscuntur ab tn-
te11eotu vel sensu interno. cognoscantur forma1iter in externo. 
sed sut"fioit in obJecto 1110 contineri, ut ex il10 aooipi pos-' 
sint. R18 The external senses apprehend the intentions virtually, 
not formally. The estimative sense apprehends them formally by 
abstracting them from the sense data in whioh they are virtually 
oontained. 
The next question about the insensate intentions is this: 
how are they perceived by the internal senses? Are they a pro-
duct of a judgment? The power of judging particulars is attribu-
ted by st. Thomas to the ~i~ c0f51tativ~ in m.an, but it is denied 
to the vis aestimatlva of an1mals.19 How does he explain the 
_ ............. .;:;.;;;.;;;.;;;;;..;;;..;;:;;;..0. .... 
animal perception 01" intentions? --By a natural aotivity of in-
stinots. He says: "(A)n1malia peroipiunt huiusmodi !ntentiones 
solum natural! quodam instinctuj homo autem etiam per quandam 
oollat1onem.,,2Q The insensate intentions are peroeived by an 
innately determ.1ned power, the 1nstlnot, or the estimative sense. 
This sense 1s endowed bY' nature to reoognize some presentations 
ot the external senses as good for the individual, others as evil. 
18Joannes a Sanoto Thoma, O.P., cur~u~ PhilosoEhicus Thomi~­
t1cus, Phil. Nat., P. IV, Q. VIII, Art. " rfI, ~4. 
-




Is this 1n aceoI'd with experience? It seems so, for if the es-
timat1ve senile were not determined bY' na.ture to act in a definite 
way, there could not be any adequate explanation of the uniformity 
and necessity of instinctive act1vity Which 1s so manifest in 
animal lite. 
There is still another characteristic of intentions whioh 
should be bI'ought out. Since suitability or harmfulness ot an 
object are relative terms, the oognitive being in knowing them 
knows both the object whioh is suitable and the subject for whioh 
the object 1s suitable. When it perceives them, it has the know-
ledge of a concrete subject-objeot relation. This note ot in-
tentions can be called the concrete involvement of selt. 5t. 
Thomas seems to indicate this in his oommentary on Aristotlets 
Q! Memoria !! Remini8centla. In order to bring out the d1tte~ence 
between the Image ot imagination and that ot sense memory, he com-
pares the two to a painting looked at fI'om two different aspects. 
He says that a senae torm (the object of imagination) ditfeI's 
from an intention (the object of sense memory) in the same way 
as a painting taken as a painting differs trom the same painting 
taken as an image of that which it represents, or of something 
previously seen and experienced. He concludes with the following 
remark: 
Sic 19ltur man1£estum est, quod quando anima oonvex-tit 
se ad phantasma, prout est quaedam forma reservata in parte 
sensitiva, sic est actus imaginatlon1s sive phantasiae, vel 
et1am intelleetus oonsiderantis circa hoc universale. 51 
autem anima oonvertatur ad ipsum, inquantum est imago ejus, 
quod prius audivimus aut intelleximus, hoc pertinet ad actum 
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.memarandi. Et quia. esse 1m.aginem signifioat intentionem 
quamdam circa formam, ideo convenienter Avioenna dicit quod 
memoria respicit intentionem, imaginatio vero formam per 
sensum apprehensam. 21 
The 1m.age of imagination 1s a representation considered in itself', 
e.g., hu.m.an face in general, a rose in general, etc. The image of 
memory is a representation of something previously experienced. 
Here the obJeot is Identified as having been a part of the sub-
jeot's oonsoiousness: "quod prius audivimus aut intelleximus," 
says st. Thomas. In these Ima~es there is an added note which 1s 
absent in those of imagination. It is the note of self-involvement 
A well-known human face or a rose which was seen by the subject 
are examples of images with consciousness of self involved in 
them. 
The notion of self-involvemsnt needs a further clarification. 
What is this self-involvement? Basically, it is a consciousness 
of onets own operation as well as the objeot or the thing whioh 
is being known in that opel:"ation. It is the knowledge of being 
affected by the sensible object or simply of senSing a thing. 
This can be explained with some simple examples, as we say, fol:" 
instance, "I remember hearing Verdi's Otello," or til remember 
lea~ning that theorem in geometry." Expressions of this kind ahow 
that the subject remembers not only the object (Verdi's Otello or 
the theorem in geometry), but also his own act in which the object 
was presented to him (hearing or learning). Selt-involvement is 
21 In De Kem. at Rem., .3, n. .343. 
/~STO~ (V- .. LOYOLA -¥~\ 
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consciousness of undergoing a modification or of receiving an 
impression from the object. 
St. Thomas brings out th1s idea quite t~l11 in some of the 
texts trom the 1E ~ Mem. ~ ReU4 To quote a few ot themr "di01-
tur memorari praeteri torum actuum.; n22 ttmemoratur allquis, quia 
[i.e., that] dldiclt ab alio, vel quia speoulatus est per aeipsum; 
ex parte vero sensibilia apprehensionis memoratur, quia audivit 
vel vidlt, vel allquo all0 sensu percepit. Semper enimo'WD. anima 
memoratur, pronunolat sa vel prius audlvisse aliquid, vel sen-
-
!i!!!, vel intell.x~~s •• "23 And again: "memoria est praeteritorum 
quantum ad no.try &Ep!:eSfltns1onem, idest quod prius senslmus vel 
intelleXimu~."24 In the next lecture St. Thomas says: "aliquis 
m8l1Oratur se intellexisse. ft25 
From this it can be seen that "intentions" imply a much 
wider field ot knowledge than may appear at first sight. The 
22~., 1, n. 3011 italics added. 
2)Ibid.J italics added. 
-
24Ib1d., 1-. n. )08; italios added. 
-25 Ibid., 2, n. 320. There is a problem in the interpretation 
of the ~d leoture. The general dootrine is that in memory we 
know both the impression ot modificAtion and the thi~ ot which it 
is the impression. In Aristotle the ~dification (xdeo'--~assio) 
would mean not only the torm resulting but also the undergoIng, 
the being atteoted or modified or impressed. Thomas tends to 
inte~ret it only in the first lense: the torm resulting (~ 
talma); but there are still enough indioations ot the passivity, 
the undergoing, the being attected. E.g., n. 345: "motus phan. 
taamatum"; "ex ll'll1:ttUtatione sensus." 
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standard examples ot intentions which St. Thomas constantly uses 
are suitability and harmfulness, fear of a wolf and love of one's 
mother. Since St. Thomas says that these as absent are the ob-
ject of memory, a superficial reader may wonder at times whether 
what is reoalled by the sense memory is only suitability, harm-
fulness, fear, love, and the like. It must be remembered that 
these are only examples of intentions. The general category of 
insensate intentions implies a muoh greater variety than appears 
at first sight. One can think of objeots apprehended whioh are 
neither harmful nor suitable. They may be indifferent. Are such 
apprehensions intentions, or are they forms? The answer may be 
this: if they possess the note of concrete involvement of selt, 
they are intentions. If they do not, they are for.ms. \Vhen the 
sense forms are reoognized as a part of the subjeot's own experi-
ence, in which the known is not merely the sensible forms but also 
the operation through which these torms a:re apprehended, they are 
not forms but torms with an intention. They are sensible tmages 
taken not sua images, but gu~ representations of something the 
subjeot identities as his own experience or knows with the note 
of concrete self-involvement. 
To sum up what has been said about the nature of the inten-
tions in qUGstion as the objeot ot memo~, it oan be stated that 
aooording to the present investigation these intentions are found 
to belong to the oategory of sensible Eer ~ooidens and to be in-
sensate in nature. It has turther been found that in sensing the 
3,6 
intentions the animal has a concrete knowledge of tho involvement 
of se~f. It knows the object as it affects it. i.e., whether the 
object is suitable for it, or good, or evil. This implies a con-
crete knowledge of the subject-objeot relation. 
Is pastness such an intontion? 
It has been said already that, although st. Thomas does not 
e;:plain it in greater detail, nevertheless, he sa.ys explicitly 
that "ipsa ratio p:I'aeteriti," the very character of being past, 
"inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur," is reckoned 'among suoh 
intentions, namely, the intentions apprehended by the estimative 
sense, such as suitability, har~ulness. and the like. Pastness, 
then, is an intention and not a mere form... Does it have the char-
acteristics of those intentions? Is it insensate in nature? The 
answer is in the affirmative. Pastness is not per!! apprehended 
by any of the external senses. But it is sensible, because it is 
assooiated with time, and is peroeived by tho sensitive being. 
Thus, it belongs to the category of sensible :eel' ~coldens, and as 
such can be ranl{ed among the insensate intentions: "inter huius-
modi intentiones computatur." 
Is there in pastness the note of concrete involvement of self? 
oes an individual in recognizing some past experience perceive 
somehow his own involvement in it? It seems that he does. In or-
der to reoognize a past event the sensitive being must know that 
this event is an item of h!! past experience. Otherwise there 
could be no roal recognition. In the Sun~a St. Thomas says that 
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animal memory extends in two direotions: it remembers the objects 
of past experience and also the subjeotwhich had that experienoe. 
Here are his words: fI[A]nimal memoratur se prius sensisse in prae-
terito, at se meneisse quoddam praeterltum sensibile"u26 In a 
real recognition the element of selt should be somehow perceived. 
How it 1s perceived is another question which Vlill have to be 
-
explained eventually. It will be treated, however, in the chapter 
on the funotion of reoognition, and therefore there is no point 
of going into it now. For the present it is sufficient to indi-
cate that in the reoognition of past events the sentient being 
must be aware of his own concrete involvement in the process. 
This demonstrates that pastness is an intention similar to suit-
ability and harmfulness and other intentions apprehended by the 
estimative sense in whioh the note of concrete involvement of 
selt 121 also present. 
Now that St. Thomas. doctrine about the nature of insensate 
intentions has been seen, the final & xplanation of the original 
problem must be given. How is there only one object of sense 
memory and not two? St. Thomas says that memory is the treasury 
of intentions, and also that its prOpel" object is sornething past 
as past. It has been suggested in the beginning of this oha.pter 
that these two are really one and tho same thing with two names or 
looked at f~om two dIfferent aspeots. Is this true? 
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It has been shown that pastness is an intention just as 
suitability and harmtulne.;;s are intentions. The word ttintention" 
is" then, a generic terln.; it is a genus, while pastness, suit-
ability, harmfulness, etc., are its species. It is clear that 
intention and pastness are not coextensive, tor in every object 
reoognized as past there is an intention, but not every intention 
contains the characteristics of pastness. But it must be r8ma~ 
bered that the object of sense memory is not all intentions of 
-
the 6~timative aense, but only those whose objects are absent. 
This puts a lim1tation on the intentions to be included under the 
title of proper object of sense memory. How is pastness related 
to the intentions of absent objects? It is not difficult to see 
that all intentions of absent objects really belong to the indi-
vidual's own past and not to his future. Once the object which 
oaused the perception of an intention is removed from conscious-
ness, the intention that remains 1s a vestige of a past experi-
ence. The intentions of absent objeots are apprehended by the 
sentient being with the note of pastness. These two (the inten-
tions of the absent objects and the note of pastness), then, seem 
to stay together. 
Can So mere sensible form be an object of sense memory'? It 
seems that it oan, provided it is reoognized as past experienoe. 
Since pastness is an intention, such a form is apprehended under 
the aspeot of an intention, and therefore is not a mere form any 
more, but a form within an intention, and as suoh can be the ob-
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ject of sense memory. 
Since the intentions of absent objects are past, and since 
pa.stness itself is an intention, it can be _aid that these two 
are coextenslve, so that where one Is, there the other is as well. 
In this sense, it may be hopefully affirmed, the note ot pastness 
and the intentions ot the absent objects are really one thing. 
The difference of names comes from the difference ot aspects from 
which it 1s considered. An~ thus, st. Thomas· seemingly dlfferent 
statements on the proper object of sense memory can be reconciled. 
There Is but one pI"oper object of sense memory.. It is the insen-
sate intentions of absent objects, to the category of which be-
longs also the :roatio Eraeteriti. Since st. Thomas says that 
pastness is that aspect under which sense memory attains the ob-
ject,27 pastness can be taken as the formal object of sense mem-
ory. But since pastness itself is an intention, st. Thomas cor-
rectly calls sense memory the treasure house of intentions of 
this kind: M[T]hesaurus huiusmod1 1ntentionum. u28 





THE FUNCTIONS OF SENSE MEMORY: RETENTION 
Two things have been disoussed wlth regard to sense memory 
in St. Thomas: its distinotion fl"om other internal senses, and 
its proper object. The present ohapter and those that follow 
will treat of the funotions of sanse memory. 
What does sense memory do? 
In the Summa, after havine; pointed out that the insensa.te 
. 
intentions a.re apprehended by the estimative sense, st. Thomas 
says that they are Rreserved in the memorative power: "Ad oon-
sorvandum autem aas ordinatur vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus 
quldam huiusmodi intentlonum. n1 And ln the De Ver1tate: "(Mle~ 
- ................................. 
oria quae oommunis est nobis et brutia, est illa 1n qua oonser-
vantur partioulares 1ntentlones. n2 Sense memory is a treasure 
house of intentions, 1.e., a place where the insensate intentions 
are retained. The act of retaining or preserving, then, is a 
funotion of sense memory. 
Sense memo:tty also reealls the intentions to aotual considera .... 
t10n aft$r they have been storad. There are two ways in whioh 
l~.!., I, 18, 4 c. 
2De Ver •• 10, 3 ad 1. 
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recall can be had: spontaneously and discU!'sively. Spontaneous 
recall is common to mon and animals. the disoursive is proper only 
to men: "Ex parte autem memoratlvae, non solum habet homo memoriam, 
siout oetera anima.lia, in subi ta reoordations p","a~terl torum; sad 
etla~ reminisoentlam, quasi syllogistioe inquirendo praeteritorum 
memoriam, seoundum lndividualas intentlones.«3 
Moreover, sense memory is the power which apprehonds the past, 
i.e •• reoognizes something as past experienoe: "Est vis apprehen-
siva praeteriti. n4 And again: "Animal mcmoratur se prius sonstase 
in praeterlto et sa sensisse quoddaIll praeteritu...'7l scnsibile. n5 
In terms of its functions sense memory oan be defined as the 
power which retains, recalls, and recognizes the object of past 
experienoe. 
This enumeration of the operations of sense memory forms a 
logical pattern according to which the treatment of the functions 
can be oonveniently presented. The act ot retention, therefore, 
shall be discuesed rirst, then that of recall, and finally the 
aot of recognition. 
But there 1s still another operation Whioh is treated by St. 
Thomas in connection with sense memory, and which was not men-
tioned in the above enumeration. It is the act by which the 
3S.T., I, 78, 4 o. 
- - . 
4Ib1d., III, 85, 4 ad 3. 
-
5Ib1d., I, 79, 6 ad 2. 
-
original impression 1s reoeived. Betore the sensible speoies are 
retained or reoalled or reoognized, they must bereoeived. The 
aot by whioh the Insensate intentions are reoeived into the store-
house of memory is presupposed in all the three subsequent acts ot 
sense memory. Although the reception ot original impressions Is 
not oonsidered by st. Thomas as a p.ttoper funotion ot memory, never-
theless he spends some time talking about it when dealing with 
memory, and hence a few words must be said about it here betore 
~aking up the presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine of the proper 
funotions of sense memory. 
In his oommentary on the De Memoria et Reminiscentia st. 
....... . ....... J. 
Thomas shows that the act ot reoeiving is not a funotion ot sense 
memory. Expla1ning Aristotle he 8a78t "Px-imo ostendit [Philoso-
~hual quod acceptio non est memoria, quia ille qui aooipit non 
~emoratux-. Secundo ostendit, quod nec e convex-so memorarl est 
laoceptl0, eo quod 111e qui memoz-atur non de novo aoc1plt. rr6 Recep-
tion is not an act of memoz-y. because he who receIves an impression 
does not remember it. The very notion ot receiv1ng excludes the 
notIon ot remembering; tor the act ot memory presupposes a pre-
~ious aot to which it reters, while reception does not, as St. 
rhomas does aa71 "(alum allquls primum addlscat vel patlatur quan-
~um ad apprehensionem sensitivam, nullam memoriam tunc resum1t, 
6rn De Mem. et aem., 4, n. 352. (The Italios of the Bpiaszi 
text are omltIid.--They will also be omitted in all subsequent 
~uotatlons from the same text.> 
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quia ninil resumitur nisi prius existens: nulla autem memoria 
praecessit; ergo primum addiseere vel sentire non est memoriam 
resum.ere."7 
Reoeption is not an act or memory for the further reason that 
memory .1s ot the past, while reoeption is ot the present: "Cum 
entm memoria sit tacti, ut supra habitum est, tunc est memor. 
quando notitia per modum habitus vel saltem passionis lam est in 
faoto e8se. Sed, cum tit prima passio in ipsa, 8cilicet aoceptlone 
notltiae, nondum est in facto essej ergo nondum tit in hOmine me-
moria ... 8 MemorY' is ot the past, and unless some interval ot time 
intervenes bet •• en the actual reception and the recall ot that r .... 
ception, there can be no memory. 
The same idea 1s expressed even olearer in thefollowtng 
paragraph: "Non en1m mem.oramur e. lnquantum in praesenti .o~ 
sclentiam habemus, sed per a8 memorari non oontingit ante factum 
tempus, soilioet antequam interveniet tempus medium inter notltiam 
prius extstentem et ips .. aemoriam. Memoratur enim nunc aliquis 
quae prius audlvlt vel vldit vel qualiteroumque passus tult, non 
aut em nunc memoratu.r quod !'l".lJ1C passus est."9 
The act ot reception cannot properly be oalled a tunotion ot 
sense memory, mainly because 1t is ot the present. Thls act may 
7Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 4. n. 353. 
9Ibid., 4, n. 354. 
-
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be asoribed to those powers which know the present as present, and 
these are the external senses and the two intev.nal reoeptive 
senses, the common sense and the vis a~stimativa.10 All these 
- . 
deal with objects which are actually stimulating the faoulties at 
the present time. The act of reoeiving properly belongs to them. 
Memory, however, is of the past. It", act is to preserve that which 
has been reoeived rather than to reoeive. Sense memory preserves 
the insensate intentions which have been reoeived bY' the estimative 
sense. 
The reoept10n ot original impressions, then, is not oonside:red 
by St. !homas as a funct10n of mem.ory. Even though it 1s basic 
and is presupposed in the proper aots of sense memory, yet it is 
aSSigned to other faculties, not to memory. With these remarks on 
the aot of reception, the presentation of St. Thomas 1 doctrine on 
the proper funotions ot sense ~mory may tinally be started; and, 
as was ment10ned before, they will be taken 1n the sequenoe 1n 
whioh the,. appear in the actual process 01" remembering--tirst, the 
act ot retention, then that or reoall, and ttnally, the aot or 
recognit1on. 
Time and aga.1n St. Thomas oalls momory a thesaurus, intentio-
num. The LatIn word thesaurus means a plaoe where anyth1ng (money, 
-
tor instance) is laid up or kept. D1ct1onaries translate it as a 
repository, a store-room, or a treasure house. Thesaurus lnten-
,.. 4 
tionum. when used to describe an interior sense, may be taken as 
lO~ I'fI ~ 78 It n 
- -
45 
a figurative description of that sense in terms ot its function of 
retaining. In st. ~homas both 1m.aginat1on and sense memol"y are 
referred to as thesaurus--imag1natlon l"etains in its treasurr sen-
sible forms, memory retains insensate intentions. 
There are in St. Thomas a number ot eXpressions in which 
mention 1s made of the retaining function of ,~,etllOrj. For .example: 
"MemoraI'l nil aliud est quam bene conservue semel accepta; ttll 
"De ratione memoriae est quod sit thesaurus vel loous consarvatl-
vus speeierum.; «12 "Anima. non _mol"atur prius quam apud 38 al1quld 
retin.atJ"13 "Vis autem memora~lva retinet.,,14 
When we speak ot the act ot retain1ng we generally reter to 
that period in the p:rooesa 01" remembe:rtng whioh 1s put between the 
original "ception of the species and its actual recall. During 
this time a vestige ot the first impl"esslon is kept in memory in 
a subconsc1ous state. It stays there until it is brought back to 
the surface ot consciousness, in ox-der to be recognized as an item 
of past experience. 
What does st. Thomas say about this period? How does he ex-
plain the act ot retaining? 
Aquinas takes up the question in the third lecture ot his 
11 In De Mem. at Rem., 1, n. 302 • 
............ ~ .~.......-.-
l2S•T., I, 79, 7 c. 
--
13De Var., 10, 2, ob. $" 
--
14In De Mem. et Rem., 2, n. 321 • 
.......................... ............... 
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commentary on Aristotle's B! Memoria !! ~R_em1 __ n_i~._o_e_n_t_i_a. It is 
true that what he expresses here is his interpretation of Aris-
totle. In order to know hIs own doctrine on the matter, it will 
be necessary to back up these comments with references to his 
or1ginal works. Th1s w111 be done as extensively as the avail-
able evidence will permit. Generally speakIng, the doctrine in 
the commentary does not differ signIficantly from the doctrine 
found in the original works. 
St. Thomas begins the third lectUIte by saying that a certain 
impressed affection remains ir:. m.emo17 after the speoies have been 
originally received by the senses. Ha says: 
Dicit [Ar1.totales] ergo primo, man1f'eatum. esse quod 
oportet intel11gere aliquam talem passionem a sensu esse fao-
tam in an1ma, at in organa corporis an1matI, cuiua quidem. 
animae memoriam dicimus esse quemdam quasi habi tum, quae 
quldem pass10 est quasi quaedam pictura, quia scil1cet se~ 
sib1le 1mpr1m1t auam sim!l1tudinem In sensu, et huius simili-
tudo remanet in phantasia etiam .ens1b1l! abeunte. Et ideo 
aublung1t quod motus quI fit a senaihili in sensum, 1mpr1m1t 
in phantasta quas1 quamdam t1guram senslb1lem, quae manet 
senstb!ll abeunte, ad modum quo 1111 quI sIg11lant cum an-
nuli. imprimunt tlguram quamdam 1n cera, quae remanet etiam 
sigillo vel annulo remoto.l5 
From this passage several Ideas should be singled out for further 
elucidation and discussion: the impression is not made, as St. 
Thomas says, on the soul alone, but also on the body; honee the 
question of the bod11y organ arises. Moreover, the impression is 
preserved in sense memo~ in the manner of a habitus; henee the 
problem of sense memory as a habitus. Finally, this impression 
l5Ibid., 3, n. 328. 
is said to be like a picture whioh resembles the object from 
"""hich it ha.s been obtained; hance a further problem of' the pre-
servation of an impression in the torm of a picture. This last 
idea leads St. Thomas to point out the distinction between the 
functions of- sense memory and of imagination. 
In the paragraphs immediately following~ st. Thomas concen-
trates on the problem of the bod1ly organ or the ooniunctu.m on 
which the impression is made. 
The impression, because it belongs to sense, 1s not made on 
the soul alone, but on the coniunctum or composite of soul and 
body: "Dicit (Philosophus] autem, in anima at 1n parte corporis: 
quia cum hulusmodi passio pel'tineat ad partem senai tlvam, quae 
est actus organio1 corporiS, huiuamodi passl0 non pertinet ad 
solam anlmam, sed ad ooniunotum. u16 That the body plays So part 
1n :i?eta1ning the species can be seen from tha fact that various 
bodily disposItions are responsible for the detects of memory. 
Siok and drunk persona have weak memories. Why? Because they 
a~e "in multo motu. q17 It is clear that an impression cannot be 
retained in a rapidly flowing substance. So, it the body 18 in 
great motion, it also retains poorly; "[P]ropter hu1usmodl causas 
corpus hominls est 1n quodam f1UXUt at ideo non poteat retinere 
impressionem quae fit ex motu rei sensibilia, siout contingeret 
• 
16~., 3, n. 329. 
l7Ibid.) 3, n, 330. 
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a1 al1quis motua vel etiam slgillum impr1meretur in aqua.m flu ... 
entem. Statim enim propter fluxum deper1ret f1gura. n18 
The same effect on memory Is had also when the motion 1s 
found in the soul. If the soul happens to be in the state of 
flux, a~ when it is moved by anger or oonoupiscenoe. memory Is 
affeoted in the same way as it is by the motion in the bOdy.19 
What does St. Thomas have to say about the organ of sense 
memory? In the S~ he says explicitly that species are pre-
served in an animated bodily organ: "[S]pec!es enlm eonservantur 
non in parte anlm.ae sensitiva. tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum 
via memoratlva sit actua orga.n! cuiusdam.. H20 And again in the l2.! 
Veri tate: "Quantumlibet enim allquls 8cientiam in habltu habeat, 
laesa tamen organa 1maglnatlvae vlrtutls vel memorativae, in actu. 
exire non potest."21 And in another place in the B! V.ritat~r 
"{C]um necessarium sit humidltatem praeclpue in cerebra abundare 
in puerls, in quo vis imaginativa et aesttmatlva et memoratlva et 
senlus communis organa sua hAbent ••• ft22 Sense memory and all 
the other interior senses have their organs in the brain. 




20.§..!_, I, 79, 6 ad 1 •. 
2lDe Ver •• 10, 2 ob. 7. 
--
22Ibid., 18, 8 o. 
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ot sena6 memory? 
First of all, it is ee:rtain that the bodllr organ does not 
exclude the ability to retain torms. The bodily organ S!! the 
power to retain speoies, tor even the nonliving beings have the 
capacity to hold, at least tor 'a time, the torms impressed on the 
This is true ~ fortiori with living beings, and especially with 
oognitive powers, as St. Thomas insists in the Summa. 23 
But, lt this association with m.atter does not keep sense 
m.emory tram retaining epecles, it has something to do ln deter-
mining the nature of its functions. At least, it imposee some ot 
the characterist10s ot matter. 
St. Thomas says that the bodily organ ot sense memory 1s in 
the brain. But the brain, tor 8t. Thomas, i8 some kind ot watery 
substanoe. In the ~e Verita~e he saysl "[I]maginativae virtutia 
organum, et memorat1vae et oogitativae, est 1n lpso oerebro, quod 
est locus summae hum1d1tatls 1n corpore humano. u24 The degree ot 
moisture in the brain varies with individuals. 25 Some have more 
water, others less. The qualIty of the body, i.e., whether the 
body is 80tt or hard, whether in motion or at rest, determines the 
capability to reoe1ve and retain the 1mpressions. A hard body re-
ce1ves the impression. with diff1culty, but it retains them well. 
23~.! •• I, 79, 6 c. 
24.e! !!£., 18, 8, ad S. 
2SIn De Mom. et Rem., 3, n. 334 • 
....... ---- .......... --. ........... 
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while a body which ls soft receives easily but retains badly. 
Now, since the organ of: sense memory 1s a substanoe with 
varying degrees of wa.ter in it, it is olear that the more water 
it oontains, the less retentive it is, and conversely. And so 
st. Thomas sa.ys in the !l! Xerltate that the reason why the young, 
generally speaking, do not have good memories, is that their brain 
contains a great amount ot water: ft[P]ropter abundant lam humidl-
tatls quae est 1n puerIs, magIs impedluntur actus harum virlum . 
[1m.aginatlvae, memorativae et cogitativae virtutIs] quam sensuum 
extemorum. nZb The tluctuating state ot young people's bodies 
acoounts tor theIr ability to reoeive impressions easily and also 
for their disability to retain them well. Too much moisture in 
the brain, then, has a negative etfect on memory. The same etfeet 
is had also when the substance ot the brain 1s hard and unyield-
ing, as, tor instanoe, when man's body becomes rigid beoause ot 
great tear, or beoause of natural hardness to reoeive sttmull. 21 
26D& Ver., 18, 8, ad 5; the same idea 1s elaborated in tne 
commentary-on the De Memoria et Reminisoentia: n{S]eoundum aut em 
complexionem tluentrs corporiS; natura!Iter eompetit i111s [puer-
Is} ut sint labI1is memoria.. Sublungit (Phl1osophua] autem quod 
similiter propter praedlota, neutrl videntur esse bene mentOres: 
neque 1111 qui aunt multum velocia apprehenslonis, neque 11li qui 
aunt multum taroae. 1111 enim quI aunt multum v.looes, sunt magi. 
hum1d! quam oportet. Hwnid1 enim est tacile reolpere impressio-
neSt 1111 aut em, qui sunt magis tard1, aunt etlam magis duri) et 
1deo veloeiua non remanet 1mpressl0 pnantasmatls in anima. tDuros 
autem non tangit,t 1d eat non reoipiunt phantaamatis ImpressIone~n 
-In De Mem. et Rem •• ), n. 332 • 
....... - ........ ~~ -
27Ibld., ), n. 331. 
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These, in gene~al, are the ways in which St. Thomas speaks ot 
the bodily organ of sense memory and ot the part it plays in the 
act of retaining the species. 28 As regards the act of retaining, 
two basic problems stlll remain to be solved, namely, the meaning 
of what St. Thomas oal1s "habitualis quaedam conservatio phantas-
matls,"29 and the distinction of sense memory from imagination in 
terms of the act of retaining. 
Sense memory is sometimes called by st. Thomas a habitus or a 
9.uasi-~ab1tus or a power which has a habit, as when he says, for 
instance: ft[Iln ipsis Interioribus v1ribus sensitivis apprehensi-
vis [possuntl poni a1iqui habitus, seoundum quos homo tit bene 
memoratlvus vel oogitatlvus vel lmaginativua. M30 The word 
•• 
28St• Thomas' theory on the bodily organ ot sense memory, even 
though it may at first sound a bit naive and scientifically tar 
outmoded, nevertheless, in its basic notions is not contra~y to 
the tindings ot modern investigations. This is not the place to 
compare St. Thomas with the modern theories on memory_ However, 
it "1' be noted in passing that St. Thomas' idea of sense memory, 
and more in particular, the role and plaoe ot its bodily organ, is 
quite In accord with what the present day soientists and philoso-
phers have to say about it. To quote Father Robert Brennan on the 
point: "From the findings of soience, it is eaar to see how memory 
depends on the brain. Even without the benefit of the vast pro-
grams of research that are being pursued today, St. Thomas was weD 
aware ot the basio relation of msmory processes to the cortex. 
Thus, seven centuries ago he pointed out that lesions ot cortioal 
substanoe may have a decided effect on both Imagination and memory 
and aotually prevent the recall of previous knowledge.*' Robert 
Edward Brennan, O.P., qeneral PSlchol0sY, revised ed. (New York, 
1952), p. 195. . 
29In De Mem. et Rem., 3, n. 349 • 
....... ........ ----- ......, --- . 
30~.I., I-II, 50, 3 ad 3. 
habitus, as used here, means a quality of a power by whioh it 1s 
disposed to aot in a certain way, and thus has a different meaning 
than the word habitualis when this latter is used to define the 
nature of retaining. Since at this point the discussion oentera 
on the nature of retaining, it will be out of place to indulge in 
an explanation of sense memory as having a habit or a disposition 
to aot. This will be discussed later (in the last chapter of the 
theSis). Here, the meaning of the term habitua11s when referring 
to the act of preserving species, must be investigated. 
In his l!l 122 ~emorla ~~ Reminiscentia St. Thomas says: "(PAle-
moria est habitus, idest hab1tualis quaed~ conservatio phantasma-
tis.")l And again: "Memor1am aut em [Phllosophus) nom1nat habitum 
. . .. , ....................... 
partls huius {sensitivael. quia memoria est in parte sensitiva: et 
in ea quae in memoria conservamus, quando que non actu apprehen-
dimus, sed quasi hab1tualiter tenemus."J2 
The last quotation gives a olue as to the meaning of the 
teohnioal term habitua11s. St. Thomas says here: "non aotu ap-
prehendimus, sed quasi habitualiter ten.mus." This indioates that 
Aquinas 1s thInking ot the function ot oonserving the speoies 1n 
terms of aot and potency. He opposes the word habltualiter to the 
word aotu. What does this mean? St. Thomas never explains this 
-
fully 1n conneotion with sense memory. But he does explain it 
31In De Mem. et Rem., 3, n. 349 • 
...... ~ .................... ~ 
32Ibld., 3, n. 329. 
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when he deals with the act of conserving in the intellectual me~ 
ory. Even though st. Thomas I theory on intellectual memory is 
different from that on sense, nevertheless, there is some analogy 
between them; a.nd, as regards the act of retaining, the doctrine 
on intelleotual memory may throw considerable light on the act of 
retaintng in sense memory, 
St. Thomas explaIns the conservation of the intellectual 
speoies in the ,§u.mma In an artIcle on intellectual memory.. There 
he says: M[S]pecies IntellIg1bI1Is allquando est in intellectu in 
potentIa tantumt at tune dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. 
Aliquando autem. secundum ultlm.am oompletionem. actus: at t'WlO in .. 
telllgit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentlam at 
actum: et tunc dielt~ esse Intellectus in habltu. Et secundum 
hune modum Intelleotu8 conservat species, etiam quando actu non 
Intel11g1t."33 When intelligible species are only potentially 
present to the intellect, the intellect 1s said to be wholly 1n 
potency. At other times the species al"ecompletely actuating the 
intelleot;, then 1t 18 simply in act. But the Intelligible speoies 
may be p:x-esent in a condition midway between pure potency and com-
plete act; then the possible intelleot is said to be lB habit~. 
It 1s in this habitual condition, between potency and act, that 
the intellect keeps acquired intelligible species when they are 
not being used in actual understanding. 
3ls.T., I, 79, 6 ad 3. 
- -
st. Thomas may have a similar explanation in mind for the re-
tention ot sensible species in sense memo~. Sense memory, after 
it has reoeived the impressions, 1s not in pure poteney any more. 
It retains some determination of the original impression. But 
this determination is not present to consciousness at all times. 
It does not actuate the potency completely, and so the power can-
not be said to be oompletely in aot. Since it is not completely 
in act, and since it is not in pure potenoy either, It must be 
in the mid-state between aot and potency. 'nlis state is oalled a 
habIt':!!_ Thus sense memory assumes the oharacter ot a habit, i.e., 
ot a state midway between complete aotuality and pure potenoy. 
And the words, then. quoted above: "non aetu appl'ehendlmus, sed 
quasi habItua1lter ten.mus,· can be taken to mean this mid-state 
between act and potenoy_ 
In other places st. Thomas uses similar expressions. Speak-
ing ot how the past 1s apprehended, he lIays: "Oum a1lquis aut em 
habet 801entiam habitualem et potentlam senslt1vam sine actlbus 
vel operationibus eorum, tunc dlcitur memorar1 praeteritorum 
actuum.".34 Discussing the difter-enoe between reception and re-
tention on the aense level, st. Thomas says that in sense powers 
"allud est reolpere Impresslonem, quod taoit sentire in aotu, at 
aliud retlnere, quando etlam resaotu non sentluntur. n.35 
.. 
34m De .em. et Rem., 1, n • .307 • 
.......................... .,.........,........ 
35Ibld., 2, n. 316. 
-
55 
Now, a still turthe~ problem conoerning the act of ~etaining 
must be solved. It 1s the problem of oonserving the phantasm in 
the sense memory in the torm of an Image. 
St. Thomas deals with this poInt in the second halt of the 
third lecture in hIs oo.mm.ent&ry on the £! Memoria .!! Reminisoentia. 
There he makes the famous distinotion between the two aspeots of 
the phantasm: the phantaSlll in itselt and the phantasm as a repre-
sentation of something previously seen or experienoed. By means ot 
this distinction Aquinas distinguishes between sense memory and 
imagination. 
The basI0 reason tor distinguishing these two powers is, ot 
oourse, the differenoe ot tn.ir formal objeots. This has been 
disoussed in the second cbapter of this thesis. Now, the question 
comes up again. On aooount of the olose similarity of funotion 
(for both sense memory and imagination are the powers whioh re-
tain), there arises a problem of whether or not the act of ~e­
ta1n1ng 1s the same for both imagination and sense memory. The 
uestion, then, is: Are there two different functions of oonser-
ing the sensible speoies, each ~or~esponding to the two interior 
senses whioh retain, or only one? It must be noted that th1s 
uestion is not put in this way by St. Thomas himself. It has been 
ormulated thus, having in mind the difficulties that some of the 
intevpreters of St. Thomas have run into when dealing with the 
otion of' retaining. The opinions of these men will be presented 
atar. Now the arguments of St. Thomas as they appear in the third 
lecture ot the 1a B! ~moria !1 Reminiso0ntia will be given. 
The question that st. Thomas (oommenting on Aristotle) 1s 
putting to himself here is how an absent thing oan be remembe~d 
if what is known in sense memory is the present impress!on. 36 
Having presented some objections, he prooeeds to answer the orig-
inal question. He gives an example of a painting oonsidered under 
two different aspects, namely, a painting taken as a painting, and 
the same painting taken as an image of what it represents. He 
says: 
(Plotest asalgnarl quomodo contingat et accidat hoo quod dic-
tum est, scilicet quod allquls ,entiat passionem pl'aesentem 
et memoretur rem absentem. Et induolt[Phl1osophus) exe~ 
plwn de 8..L.'1.ima.ll quod ping! tur 1n tabula, quod quidem et est 
animal piotum et est imago an1malis veri. Bt, oum idem sub-
ieoto sit cui conveniunt haec ambo, d1tferunt tamen haec duo 
ratione; at ideo a11a est oonalderatloeius Inquantum est 
animal pietum, et alia inquantum est imago anil1lGli8 veri; ita 
etlam et phantasms. quod est in noblspotest acolpl vtl prout 
est allquod 1n se, vel prout est phantaama alterlus. J7 
A painting consldered as a llkeness differs from the same painting 
considered in itself, i.e., without the reference to the likeness 
of the thing which it represents. On tho basis of this example 
st. Thomas goes on to distinguish between the mnemonic image and 
the image o£ the imagination. He says.: ItEt seoundum se quid em est 
quoddam speculatum, oirca quod speculatur intellectus vel pban-
tasie. quantum pertinet ad partem sensitivam. Secundum vero quod 
est phantasma alterius quod prius senalmus vel lntelleximus, sic 
36Ib1d., 3, n. 335. 
37Ibid., ), n. 340. 
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consideratur ut imago in allud duoens 6t prinoiplum memorandl."38 
The phantasm cons1dered in itselt pertains to the imagination, but 
the same phantasm considered as a representation pertains to sense 
m8mo17_ The mnemonic image points to a thing which we have seen 
or understood in the past. Thus, 1n knowing a phantasm as a re-
presentation ot previous experience, even though it 1s present to 
us, we can know in it absent things. 
But this does not seem to be the ba.sic problem under oon ... 
sideration. St. Thomas ooncentrates here rather on the difference 
between imagination and .ense memory. The three paragraphs whlch 
tollow are devoted to this problem, parts ot which oan be repro-
duced here: 
Et 1deo, oum. anima memo~etursecundum modum phantasma-
t1s, 8i anima oonvertatur ad Ipsum secundum se, sio vldetur 
animae ades •• vel allquid 1ntell1Clb11e quod 1ntelleotus in 
phantasmate Insploit vel simplioiter phantasma quod vis 
1maglnativa apprehendlt. 51 vero anIma oonvertat se ad 
phantasma Inquantum. est phantasma alterlus, at oonslderet 
ipSUD1 tamquam tmaginem 8ius quod prius senstmuB vel Intel-
lex1mus, ut diotum est ciroa pioturam. • • , haeo iam est 
alla passio huIus considerationis, quIa videlioet lam hoo ad 
memoriam pert1net. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Sic 191tur manif.stum est quod quandoani.ma. convert1t se 
ad phantasma, prout est quaedam forma reservata in parte sen-
sltlva, s10 est actus imaginatlonis sive phantasiae, vel 
etlam intellectus conslderant1s 01roa hoo universale. 81 
autem anima convertatur ad ipsum inquantum est Imago eIus 
quod prius audIvlmus aut Intellexlmus, hoo pertinet ad aotum 
memorandi. Et quia ease imaginem s1gnlficat intentlonem 
quamdam oirca formam, ideo convenienter Avioenna d101t quod 





Sense memory 1s distinguished trom imagination not only by 
reason of the different aspects ot the phantasm Wlder whioh these 
two powers oonsider the phantasm. but also by reason of the dif-
ferent aots by whioh they attain those aspects. When the soul 
turns to the phantasm as to a form preaerved in the sensitive soul 
then this act is that ot the imaginat1on. When the soul turns to 
-
the phantasm as to a representation of some pz-evious experienoe, 
then it is the .!2! of the sense memory. 
It 1s not clear from these passages that the acts reterred to 
are the acts ot retaining. Rather, the words oonvertatur and con-
-
vertat !! indicate that st. Thomas 1s thinklng here of the tune. 
tlon of recognition or at least ot reoall. However, 1n the last 
paragraph ot the third lecture it is stated that this distinotion 
pertains also to the act ot retaIning. St. Thomas says: "[Mlamor-
1a eat habItus, idest habituali. quaedam oonservatl0 phantasmatls, 
non quldem secundum selpsum (hoc enlm pertlnet ad vil'tutem. 1mag1-
nativam), sed Inquantum .phantaema eat 1ma.go allcuiua prius sen-
8at1."4o Memory pr-esel"Ves the phantasm in a manner which 1s callet 
by st. Thomas habitual, 1.e., midway between complete actuality and 
p~e potency_ But th1s preservation is not that or imaginatIon. 
Imagination retains the phantasm 1nasmuch as 1t is a phantasm; 
)9~., ), nn. 341-3. 
40Ibid., 3, n. -349. 
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memory, inasmuoh as it 1s a rep~esentation ot our own p~evious 
experience. So, the aot ot retaining ot sense memory !! different 
from that ot the imagination. This difference is based ultimately 
on the differenoe of objeots: sensa memory retains the phantasm as 
an image, while the imagination retains it merely as a phantasm. 
It seems that St. Thomas makes it quite clear here that both 
sense memory and imagination are powers which retain. Neverthe-
less, this point has been oalled into question by writers on 
Thomistio psyohology. Hence, betore oonoluding this chapter, it 
will be useful to reproduce the opinions of some ot these men. 
In his recent book, ~ PhilosoEhl 2! Human Nature, Father 
G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., put forth his opinion that the retention 
of past estimations is suffioiently explained by the retention ot 
an impressed speoies through the function of imagination. He ar-
gues tI'om the faot that the memorative power does not have an im-
manent image. Father Klubertanz says: 
In the conoluding discussion of the imagination, we ar-
gued that the act ot the imagination involves an immanent ob-ject, really d1st1not as term from the operation whioh pro-
duces it; this immanent objeot 1s oalled the image. Can a 
similar argument be used to show that the memoI'atlve power 
also has an immanent objeot (namely, the concrete relation 01' 
good and evil)1 Now, the argument that the image is an im-
manent objeot has two p~ts: (a) an appeal to the direot im-
mediate experienoe of the image; (b) an argument that in the 
cases of absent or nonexistent sensibles (for example, the 
hippogryph) there must be something which we imagine. In the 
case of the memorative power~ it does not seem that an 1~ 
manent objeot is experienced. The retention of past estima-
tions 1. suffioiently explained by the retention of an im-
pressed s12ecies. In those oases where we I'emembeI' the es-
timations a~out absent objeots, the object known is perhaps 
the image of the imagination. A difficulty against an ~ 
.manent objeot in the memora:tive power is this, that 1t is 
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very' hard to see how concrete relation {that is, good or 
ev1l) can be expressed without its term.s-and the terms are 
evidently in the imagination. Beoause of the obsourity of 
this problem, we will leave it unsolved.4l 
Father Klubertanz thinks that since there is no immanent objeot in 
the memorative power, and since this object is retained in the 
imagination, th~ power to retain would seem to belong properly to 
the imagination, But, as Father Klubertanz says at the end of the 
passage. this is an obscure problem, and therefore he prefers to 
leave it unsolved. 
Father Robert E. Brennan, a.p., in h1s ~ticle "The Thomistio 
Concept of Imagination," propounds an interpretation of St •. Thomas 
which 1s quite in opposition to tha.t of Father Klubertanz.. Father 
Brennan seems to think that there are images both for imagination 
and for memory: "[8]in08 the knowledge of estimative power is the 
primary principle of memory, then the images of memory Pe-present 
the insensate 1ntentions ot sensible Objects. The phantasms ot 
imagination, on the othe~ hand, a~e always sensate in nature. n42 
Even though the memo~ial powe~ can extend to the tempo~al 
identification ot the phantasms of imagination, Father Brennan 
thinks that, if memory did not perform its own speoific function 
ot recording the biologioal situations in which the animal finds 
itself, then it oould not be distinguished as a separate power. 
41aeorge p. nubertanB,' S. J., ~ PhilosoEhZ .2!. ¥um.an !fature 
(New York, 1953), p_ 139-140. 
42Robert E. Brennan, O.P., "~he Thomistio Conoept of Imagina~ 
tiOD," 159. 
Imagination, working in conjunction with the estimative sense, 
would be sutficient to meet the demands of animal 1i£e.43 
So, in ~'1ather Brennan's opinion, there is a record1ng of the 
- -
biologioal situations (in other words, of the insensate intentions} 
as there is also a separate power which performs this recording 
through its own specific function. 
One more opinion c&.nbe presented. 
Mr. Rudolf Allers in his essay on "Intellectual Cognition," 
published in Essays ~ Thom!sm, has some remarks on the problem. 
Discussing the capacity of the internal aenses to retain and re-
call, he compares the modern usage of the words "memory" and "1m.-
agination" with the terminology ot st. Thomas, and sayst 
Reproducing some kind ot image, however, is the ade-
quate performance of the internal senses and especially of 
the sense called '1maginat1on. t To be reproduced atter an 
interval of time, the image has to be conserved from the 
moment of peroeptive awareness until the moment when lt is 
called back. The oapacity of retention and eventual recall 
1s called 'memor7 f 1n modern psychology. St. Thomas, how-
ever, credits what he calls imagination with both retention 
and reproduction. Memory. to him, is also one of the in-
ternal senses; but its 1'unotion is limited to adding the 
torma11t7 ot paatneas to the image, that is, to endowing the 
image with III peculiar charaote:o by whioh it is recognized as 
reproduction. This dlfferent use of the two terms 11magina-
tion' and 'memory' has oaused some misunderstanding between 
modern .mp1ricalt~nd Thomist psychologists, and should be 
carefully noted.lf4 
44Rudolt Allers, "Intellectual Cognition," published in Ea-
saYS4
1n Thomism, ed. Robert E. Brennan, O.P. (New York, 1942);-
pp. ~5. ' 
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The point to be noted here is that the funotion of sense memory 
(in the Thomist sense) is limited to adding the fo~mality ot 
pastness to the image. The retention and even the recall is the 
function of the imagination. 
In the light ot these conflioting interpretations of st. 
Thomas, one thing becomes clear: the distinotion between the 
functions of sense ~emory and imagination is a knotty question 
which hardly admits an absolutely clear-out solution. And a re-
mark as that made by John of st. Thomas, namely "quod manloria sit 
conservativa, nullu8 dubltat, alias non esset memoria, si non con-
servaret speoles,n45 sounds a bIt unreal. A more realistio ap-
proach perhaps, but a rather pessimistic one, 1s that taken by 
Father Klubertanz, who feels that the solution 1s well nigh i~ 
possible. 
Faoed with suoh admissions, it would be presumptuous to pre-
tend to give a definite solution to the problem. Ho •• ver, one can 
always try to p10k the one which 1s more probable. 
From what st. Thomas says in the th1rd lecture ot his eo~ 
mentary on the De Memoria at Rem.iniscent1a, it would seem. that he 
...-.-. ~, . 
ass1gns to each power, 1.e •• sense memory and imagina.tion, a dif-
ferent act of retention. 'fhis is ex.plioitly stated in the last 
paragraph where he says: "[Mlamor!a est habitus, 1dest habitualis 
quaedam oonsenatio phantasmat1.s, non quidem seoundum. se:tpaum. (hoo 
.. 
45Joannes a S. Thoma, Ourens Philosophicus 'fhomisticua, P. IV, 
q. 8~ a. 2; 'O. 255. 
enim pertlnet ad virtutem imaglnatlvam), 8~d inquantum phantasma 
est imago allculus prius sensatl."46 The imagination retaIns the 
phantasm inasmuch as It is a. phantasm, 1.e" the sensible forms. 
Sense memory retains the phantasm inasmuoh as it is a representa-
tion of something prevIously experienoed. It seems that aocording 
to st. Thomas there is only one immanent image or phantasm con-
cerved in internal sensation.47 Since imaglnation and sense mem-
or"T are concerned with one and the same phantasm. it ean be sald 
that the retention of the totality of the phantasm, i.e., with all 
its aspects, 113 accomplianed through the funct10n of both sense 
memory and imagination. However, there are various aspects under 
Which the phantasm 113 conserved. These are the sensible forms and 
rl 
46!!,! 2! .!!!g. !! !!.!m., 3 , n. 349. 
47concerning the uniclt1 of the phantasm Father G. Klubertanz 
S.J., has the tollowing footnote in his work, The Ph110s02hZ £! 
Human Nature: "Many Thomists, tollowing John ont. Thomas, Cursu. 
PnItesoEnloua Thomiaticus, Part IV, q. 8, a. 4, maintain that Im-
agInation,' estImatIve power and memoratlve power each produce an 
immanent object. • •• As far as St. Thomas ia concerned, it woule 
.eem that he think. there 1s only one image or phantasm wIth which 
all three ot the powers are concerned, eaoh in its own way; ot. 
st. Thomas, Conw. 1n libro8 Ethieorum, Bk. ~, leet. 7 (ad. Plrotta 
nos. 1214-1sr;-Teci7 9 (nos. f~-9); Bk. 2, leot. 11 (no. 381)." 
The Phl1oaoI~ of Human Nature, pp. 139-40. 
- The un ctyoltl:ii Plian'Easm 1s hinted at in the commentary on 
the De Memoria at Remin1acentla, where st. Tr~mas says: "Et 1n-
ducitexemp1uni de aiiIma!1 q.uo(! pingitur in tabula, quod qu1dem et 
est animal pictum et est imago animalia veri. Et, cum idem sub-
ieoto sit cui conveniunt haec ambo, difterunt tamen haec duo 
ratione; at ideo alla est aonsideratio etuB Inquantum est animal 
pictum, et alia inquantwn est imago animalls veri; Ita etiam at 
phantaama quod est 1n nobis poteat accipi vel prout est 81Iquod in 
ae, vel prout eat phantaama alteriua." In ne Xem. at Rem., 3, n. 
340. --- --
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the insensate intentions. On account ot the dl£ference of these 
two formalities, st. Thomas postulates different powers to appre-
hend and conserve them. For the conserva.tion of sensible forms 
St. Thomas postulates imagination: "Ad harum[senslblllum] autem 
£or:marum rstentione.tl'l aut cons6l:'vs.tionem ordinatur pb.antasla ..!.!.!.! 
~maginatio, quae idem aunt: est auim phantasla sive im.aginatI0 
quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum.,,48 For the 
conservation of insensate intentions st. Thomas pOSits the msMora-
tive power: "Ad oonservandum autem ea.s tintentlones quae per sen-
sa~ non accipiuntur] l1! ;~_e~m_o_r_a_t_i_v_a, quae est thesaurus quldam 
hulusnlodl intentionum.,,49 Thus it may be concluded that aooording 
to St. Thomas there are two different acts of retention: the 1'0-
tention o£ sensible forms through the £unotion of imagination and 
the retention ot insensate intentions through the function of the 
memoratlve power. 
As has been seen in this chapter) the proper funotions of 
sense memory are retention, recall, and recognition. So far the 
function o£ retaining has been exam..ined. According to St. Thomas, 
sense memory is a power which retains insensate intentions. Since 
th1s power functions in association with a bodily organ, its acts 
are at£ected by material conditions and even possess certain 
material oharacteristics, as the dependence of the quality of re-
, I I 





tention upon the quality of the Substru1ce of the brain. The tunc-
tion of retention is expla.ined further by st. Thomas in terms of 
act and. potency as being a habitus, a mid-state between complete 
act and pure potency. Finally, it appears tha.t accordinG to St. 
Thoma.s the retention in sense memory is distinct from the reten-
tion in the imagination. Some fur<ther clarification of retention 
can be expected fX'OIll St. Thomas' explanation of the two remaining 
functions of sense memory_ 
Now the nature of recall must be considered. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FUNCTIONS OF SENSE MEMORY: RECALL 
The thesauric function of sense memory would be useless it it 
were not ordered to a higher act--the recall ot the preserved spe-
oies to the field of consciousness. And so St. Thomas says: "[R]e-
quiritur quod ea quae prius tuerunt apprehensa per sensus at in-
terins oonservata, iterum ad actualem considerationem ravocen-
tur."l 
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of 
restoration processes: the first is simple recall, whereln things 
are brought back to consciousness spontaneously without the aid of 
any device. This is oommon to botb man and animal. The seoond 1s 
a rationally controlled process oalled remin1scence or recollec-
tion, wherein past events are reoalled with the help and guidanoe 
of reason. Recollection is a strictly human aohievement. On this 
point St. Thomas says in the Sum.m.a: "Ex parte autem memorativae, 
non solum habet [homo] memoriam, slout cetera animalia, 1n sublta 
reoordatione praeterltorum; sed etial'il J;"emin1seentiam, quasi syl-
logistioe inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, seoundum individuales 
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intentionea."2 Man has both memory, whioh 1s an immediate reool-
lection ot the past, and reminiscenoe, which is that recolleotion 
by which man seeks 81110gistioally for the reoall or the past by 
the applioation of individual intentions. The word ~ublto perhaps 
means "immediately" rather than "suddenly,n for the aot ot simple 
reoall presents the lost object to memory without the help of the 
medium, i.e., the syllogistio guidance of reason, while reminis-
cenoe searches for the forgotten objeots through the intenentlon 
and under the direotion of reason. 
Perhaps the majority ot memory responses, even in man, in-
volve nothIng more than the rath~r automatio reoall. 
It must be admlttedthat St. Thomas does not say very muoh 
about this reoall. While he devoted to reminisoenoe five lectures 
1n his commentary on Aristotle's ~ Memoria !! Reminisoenti., he 
has only a tew scanty remarks on simple reoall. Besides the one 
just quoted trom the Summa he has a tew more elsewhere. Thus, tor 
Instanoe, in his De Anima St. Thomas salst n[R]ememoratlva virtu. 
-
In alils quidem anIm.alibus absque inquisitione suam operatlonem 
habet, in hominibus autem cum inquisitione et stUdio; unde in hom!-
nibus non solum est memoria, sed reminisoentia.") Speaking in the 
eighth leoture ot the l!1 B! Memoria .!! Rem.ini.centi~ ot the de-
liberate searoh tor past experienoes in man, he says that there is 
2S.T., I, 78, 4 c. 
--
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a parallel ope~atlon in animals which funotions as a certain ne.-
utral instinot: "(D).lib.ratio autem solis hominibus competitj 
cetera vero animalia non ex «ellberatione, sed ex quodam naturali 
instinctu operantur."4 
Beyond such oversimplified desoriptions of the spontaneous 
reoall, St. Thomas does not oblige us with any lengthy treatment 
of the nature of this function. However, he has something to say 
about it in his treatment on reminiscence. The ideas on simple 
recall can, perhaps, be best pointed out in the presentation ot 
the dootrine on reminisoence. Henoe, the matter found in the flve 
last lectures of the In De Memoria at Reminisoent!a oan be 1~ 
............. ---
med1ately taken up tor disoussion. The ideas on simple recall 
will be pointed out as they oome up there. 
As has been noted already, reminisoence oonsists In the ra-
tionally directed recall of past memories. Only man is able to 
":remin1soe" or recollect in this sense. This is a capacIty which, 
in a way, transoends the purely sensory funotions of human organ-
ism, involving, as it does, the intellectual faoulties ot man. 
What is reminiscence? 
In ans.e~ing this question, Aristotle, and St. Thomas atter 
him, Show first what reminisoence is not. They distInguish it 
trom other types ot knowledge whioh have a certain siml1~lty to 
it. These are the acquisition of new knowledge and the repeated 
recovery of the same memo~1es. Reminiscence is neither of these: 
"[R]em1niscentia nsque est res~~ptio memorise, 1ta quodn1hil 
aliud sit rem1nisol quam iterato memorari; nsque itsrum reminis-
centia est prima acceptio allouius aogno8cibl1is, puts quae fit 
per sensum vel per intellectum."5 That the acquisition of new 
knowledge is not ~emin1scence is clear enough; tor, as has been 
pointed out in the beginning of Chapter IV, the reception of 
original impressions does not pertain to the realm of memor~. 
Memory presupposes a lapse of time, and therefore, the moment ot 
the original experienoe and the moment of the memory or this .x .... 
perience are never Identlcal.6 It reminiscence is a type ot re-
call of East experienoes, it 1s not the same as the acquIsItion 
of ~ knowledge. NeIther is it a repeated recove~ ot memories. 
To recollect is not, as the LatIn text says, ite~ato memoroari. In , 
order to recover memories, one does not necessarily need the di-
reotion ot reason. This oan be done, and otten is done, by means 
ot simple recall. Reminiscence is something else. 
in a paragr'apb. ot the fourth lecture St. Thomas explains the 
positive side ot reminiscence in the following way' 
[R]emniaoentla eat ~esumptio pl'imae aoceptionis. • • • S10ut 
enim memorari retertur ad prius factam notlt!am, ita et re-
:n1n1scl. Et tunc .est reminisol,' scilicet cum aliquo modo 
resumimus prlorem apprehensionem, non autem ita quod reminis-
centis. sit aliquid eorum quae dicta Bunt, vel sensus, vel 
5Ib1d., 4, n. 351. 
-
6Ib1d., 4, nn. 353-4. 
-
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.mel1'lOria, vel phantas1a, vel sOient!a; sed per !'emin1scentlam 
accidit memorari, quia reminiscent!a est quldam motus ad me-
morandum. Et sic memoria sequitur reminiscentIam,. siout ter-
minus motum. 
Vel secundum aliam literam., reminiscent!& sequItur memo-
riam, quia s!out inquisitio ration!. est via ad Allqq1d cog-
noscendum, et tamen ex a11quo procedit, ita reminiscentia est 
via ad aliquid memorandUm, et ta.men ex a11quo memorato pro-
cedit, ut intra patebit.7 
ReminIscence, then, 1s the reoovery of original knowledge (not the 
acquisition ot it) whioh was there by.t had disappeared because it 
was torgotten. It is the way to lost memories, the effort to re-
capture them.. But al though rem1ni8c~nce leads to remeniberlng, 1 t 
is not the same as remembering. 1'his latter does not neoessarily 
imply the tormer, but the to~er (reminiscence) always Implies the 
latter (rem~b.r1ng); tor memory tollows upon the successtul act 
ot recollecting. st. Thomas says that reminiscence is the re-
covery ot the or1sinal !powledge. In this it does not ditter 
trom memory, tor the objeot ot memory is also the recovery ot the 
orIginal knowledge: "stout enlm memorari retertur ad prius tactam 
notitiam, ita et remin1acl. u8 The objects ot reminiscenoe and ot 
m.emory, then, are the same. 
But the assertion that reminiscence is the recovery ot the 
orIginal knowledge requires qualification. Not every such recove 
is reminiscenoe. For instance, a person may learn or discover the 
same tning twice. Reminiscence is not this. It 1s true that both 




h. who recollects and he who ~ele~ns recover the knowledge they 
have lost. But recollecting dIffers from relearning because, as 
St. Thomas sayst "[1]11. quI rendniscitur recuperat eam [not1t1am 
quam amisltJ sub ratione memoriae, in ordine scilicet ad id quod 
prius tuit c ogni tum; ille autem, qui Iterato add1sc1t, recuperat 
eam absolute, non quasi allouius prIus cogn1t1. n9, Hecerllecting 1s 
not a mere relear.ning. because recollecting is the way to know-
ledge which belongs to the realm ot memory, that 1s to say. it 
takes its origin from the specIes preserved in memory, whilere-
leam1ng may have nothing to do with memory, as it can take a co~ 
pletely tresh start. 10 Recolleoting and relearning are different 
kinds of knowledge because they proceed from different prin-
ciples.ll 
The tact that the principle ot reminisoence is an object 
pI-eserved in memory, gives another insight into the nature of 
reminiscence. It has been said previously that the term of re-
miniscence 1s the same as that of memory. Now it is pointed out 
in St. Thomas' commentarJ that the principle of reminiscence is 
also memory. It is the species preserved in memory that sets the 
acts ot reminiscence 1n motion. ' The process ot recapturing the 
lost memories starts from other memories which are not lost. 
9Ibid., 6, n. 372. 
lOIbid., 6, n. 373. 
-
llIb1d., 6, n. 372. 
-
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Hence, reminiscence, in so tar as it has to do with knowledge, be-
longs to that category 01" cognit1on whioh 1s proper to memory. It 
beg1ns w1th memory and it ends w1th memory. It is a part of the 
memorat1ve process. 
The idea of the prinoiple of rettdniscenoe brings up the ques-
tion of the oaUle ot reminiscenoe. It has been said that re.minis-
OGnoe finds the stLmulus to motion from the species preserved in 
the store-house ot memory. How does this species set reminiscenoe 
in motion? 
st. Thomas insists that only he reoollects properly who is 
able to move trom the starting point to the finish by his own ef-
forts. It he cannot do this of h1mself (as when he has totally 
forgotten) but 1s in need of external ass1stanoe, he 1s not said 
to be recollecting. but relearning or merely learning for the 
f1rst ttme.12 External assls~anoe is d1scarded as the motive 
powett ot the aots ot reminisoence. The beginning of movement has 
to oome from within. 
What is there within man that brings about the funotioning of 
tteminiscence? 
Aocording to st. Thomas, the cause of reminiscenoe is the or-
der or conneotion of movements whioh has been established in the 
soul when the first impreSsions were reoeived. st. Thomas says: 
"Causa autem remin1acendi est ordo motuum, qui relinquuntur in 




anima ex pr1ma 1mp1"'ess1one eius, quod primo apprehendtmus."lJ 
Then st. Thomas deacz.1bes the nature of this order. He says that 
it is a native inolination of the soul to reproduce the represen-
tations in the ordal' and relationship ot their original ooourrence 
"[R]em1n1soentiae oontlngunt per hoo quod unus motus natu. est 
post alium nobis oocurrere."14 And this happens in two ways: 
Uno modo, quando seoundus motus consequltur post pr1.mnm. mo-
tum ex necessitate, siout ad apprehensionem hominis sequitur 
apprehensio animalls ex neoessitate: et slc manitestum est, 
quod quando anima movetur primo motu, movebl tur etlam se-
cundo. Alio vera modo contingit, quia secundus motus se-
quitur post primum non ex neoessitate, sed ex oonsuetudine. 
quia soilioet aliquls oonauevit post hoc oogitare vel dioere 
vel raoere, et tunc secundua motus sequitur post primum non 
semper, sed ut ad multum, Idest ut in pluribua. siout etiam 
etfeotua natyrales ut in pluribus ex suis causis sequuntur, 
non .emper. l !> 
The order of movements can be neoessary, or it can be custom.arl'. 
In the type which is neoessa1"'7. two or more movements are so con-
nected with eaoh other that, 1t one is reoalled, the other will 
be invar1ably reoalled also. When one remembers "man," he also 
remembers "animal." In the customary type, the connection 1s es-
tabllahed by an impress ot custom, as when, for instanoe, a cer-
tain experience has become a custom by repetition. 
Reminiscence 18 not a random or accidental affair. It ad ... 
vances according to the established pattern which ex1sts between 
IJlbld., S, n. 3S9. 




the images. What is this pattern? According to st. Thomas it 
can be either the succession or time or the sucoession of the ob-
jects known. 16 Vinen recollecting prooeeds along a time series ot 
events, it may do so, for example, by beginning with those event. 
which are most reoent and gradually retrogressing to experiences 
that are more remote. 17 When recollecting proceeds along the line 
ot the objects known, it can do so aooording to the three laws of 
aasociation: first, the law of similarity, whioh says that like 
suggest like. Thus, when we think ot Soorates, for example, it 
is easy to taink of Plato, since both were outstanding Greek 
philosophers. Next, the law ot oontrast, wh1ch states that llke 
has a tendency to suggest unlike. As tor instance, the mention 
ot Hector's name may bring back the memory ot Achilles, sinoe one 
was the enemy- of the other. Thirdly, the law of proximity, whioh 
says that remembering one thing brings back to memory all those 
things whioh are near to it or connected with it. The memory of 
a father oan cause the memo1'7 ot the son. The connection in this 
case oan be that of association, ot space. or of t1me. 18 
This, in general, is the pattern acoording to which reminis-
cence brings back into consciousness the lost parts of our memory. 
The laws of association are oertain links which oonnect various 




experiences into one whole. When a part of a previous experience 
is remembered, it tends to recall the remaining parts. This has 
some practical implications tor those who want to improve their 
memories. The topio of: how to train one's memory, however, will 
be taken up in the last chapter ot the thesis. 
Concerning the cause ot reminisoence, it may be further asked 
whether the order ot movements whioh has been established in the 
soul with the first impression operates ot itself, or is there 
something else whioh sets it in motion? st. Thomas considers 
this question in the titth leoture ot the 1!! ~ ~ezq.oria ~ Hemin-
iseentta. He says that this order may operate ot itselt, even 
oasually, but that this is not properly reminiscence. Reminis-
cence proper is that which receives the 1mpulse to aottrom the 
intelleotual powers.. On this St. Thomas says: 
Est autam considerandum ulterius, quod quando que per-
venltur ad motum posterlorem ex allquo priori secundum prae-
dictum modum ab his qui quaerunt Invenire motum consequent em 
perdltum, at hoc propria est rem1nlscl; quando scilicet 
aliquis ex intentione Inquirit allcuius rei memoriam. Con-
tinglt autem quandcque quod etiam 1111 qui non quaerunt ma-
merari, propterea. quod sic procedentes ex priori motu in 
posteriorem, ut dictum est, deven1unt in memoriam a,licuius 
rei, cum il1e motus rei oblltae fiat in anima post al1um, 
et hoc quidem erat praeter intent10nem tsedut secundum 
multa,' idest in pluribus, tacti. a11is motlbus quales dlxl-
mus, scilicet sim111bus vel contr'ariis vel propinquis, in-
surgebat 111e motus qui occurrit; sed hoo abusive dicitur 
reminlsci. Est autem oasualiter memorari secundum simil!-
tudlnem quamdam reminiscentlae. 19 
19Ibid., 5, n • .;366; the sentence ttContingit aut em ••• " 
seems to-bi def:ective. A verb is missing either for i11! or tor 
2ropter'e~ .9.!!29:. 
Reminisoenoe proper supposes some sort of intellectual aotivity. 
It the recall oocurs unintentionally, it is "abusively" oalled 
reminisoence. 
The distinotion between proper and improper reminiscenoe is, 
perhaps, the distinction between the simple recall and the recall 
which bears the name at reminiscence. Although St. Thomas does 
not say 80 explioitly, yet, when h. reters to that type of re-
minisoence whioh Is casual or nonlntentional, he seems to be 
talking about the same recall ot which he makes mention in the 
Summa. as the ~ublta r.c,ordati~ :era~teritorum,20 and in I!l!. Dt.-
euted gUestion £! A;nima as th! reoall which is aocomplished .!2.!'" 
~ue Intentione. 21 As 1s olear trom the quotation, the "abusive" 
or improper reminiscenoe (or the simple reoall), Just as the re-
minisoenoe proper, is the return of obJeots to awareness by reason 
ot the relation between the images. But in the Simple recall this 
oomes about automatically, without a conscious effort, while in 
reminisoence 1t is aohieved consciously. with the help of reason 
and w111. Thus the maln d1fference between the simple recall and 
reminiscence seems to be the absence or the presenoe of intellec-
tual guidance in the searoh tor forgotten objeots. The first il 
common to both men and animals, the seoond 1s proper only to men. 
The faculty exercising the function of reminiscenoe comes to 
.. 
2OS.T., I, 78. 4 c. 
--2Ig.~. 2! As., 13 c. 
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the very threshold ot intelleotual aotivity. It searohes for the 
lost objeots ot memor,y by means ot syllogistic reasoning. 22 
Nevertheless, reminiscenoe as such does not enter the sphere ot 
intellectual operation strictly speaking. Its aotivity 1s con-
tined to partioular representations, and the universality re-
quired tor intelleotual knowledge is completely lacking. In the 
S~ St. Thomas says that reminiscenoe is a search tOI' torgotten 
events according to lndlvidua,l Intentlons. 2,3 
Besides, In the eighth leoture of the,!!! l2! !4emoria ~ l!!l!!-
nisoentia St. Thomas shows that reminisoenoe is not an intellec-
tual actIvity by proving that it operates in a bodily organ. That 
reminiscence 113 a searohing for an image in a corporeal substance 
is demonstrated by the taot that when a person is unable to re-
member, he experiences the teeling of unrest. This restlessness 
ma'1 perSist against his will, as it frequently happens in persons 
ot melancholic t.JIp.~ram.ent. 'fhis is a sign that reminisoenoe 
operates 1n a bodily organ, for only the passions ot the body 
cannot be stopped at will. St. Thomas ooncludes that reminiscence 
i8 an aotivity ot senaea u510 ergo patet quod reminiscentia est 
carporalis passio, nee est actus partis intellectlvae sed sensl-
t1vae, quae .t1am in hominG est nobl11or et virtuoslor quam in 
22,!!! .lli! .!!m • .!! '!g •• 8, n. 399. 
2.3!.1_, I, 78, 4 c. 
78 
o.liis an1malibus propter coniunetionem ad 1ntelleetum."24. Re-
min1scence 1s properly a sense power. In man it is elevated by 
reason ot its association with intellect. But this association 
is external, for it consists only 1n guiding or helping. Reminis-
cence proper belongs to sense, since, as has been said, it in-
volves movement from one particular image to another. 
So tar several notes of the nature ot reminiscence have ap-
peared. Reminiscence is the process or tna way to actual re-
membering; its prinCiple is the various speoies preserved in 
memory and the order among these speoies; its object is the same 
as that ot remembering; and finally ra~nisoence, even though it 
functions in connection with reAson, neve~theless it properly 
belongs to sense. 
Two more questions remain to be considered in this chapter: 
the distinction of the act of reoall in sense memory and imagina-
tion, and the question whether or not reminiscence 1s a faculty 
distinct from the faculty of sense memory. 
With regard to the problem of the distinotion of the aot of 
recall in sense memory and imagination, first it may be inquired 
Whether r~call properly belongs to the powers which retain or to 
those which apprehend. 
A brief discussion of this question is found in John of St. 
Thomas. Commenting on the passage in the DisEuted Suestio~ B! 
24In De Mem. et Rem., 8, n. 408 • 
.............. .........-.. .................... 
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Anima cited in the beginning of this chaptel' and more particular-
lyon the words: "{R]equiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt appre-
hanaa per sensus et interlus conservata, iterum ad actuale.m con ... 
slderatlonem revooentur, n25 John of St. Thomas says that "maxims 
pertinet ad memoriam ipsa excltatl0, qua aliquid revocatur seu 
lnciplt habere actualem oons:tderatlonem. n26 l~rny does exoltstion 
belong to memory? Can, perhaps, the reoal1 be caused by some 
other power, whioh 1s distinct from memo17, tor instanoe, the 
apprehensive powers? John of St. tpbomas answers that the excita-
tion must be performed by the re~1n1ng taoulty, beoause the 
species which cause the recall are in the power which retains 
them, and not in the power which apprehends them. To quote John 
of' St. Thomas: 
Nee poteat diei, quod excltatl0 fit non in ipsa potentia 
oonservante speciem, sed in potentia apprehendente, quae est 
distlncta ab ea, quae oonservat apeciem. Nam eontra est, 
quia ipsa excitatio non tit nisi utendo speeie. Ergo al ln 
potentia apprehendente non datur species, sed in conservante, 
non poterit ipsa apprehend.ns exoitarl, nisl prius per ali-
quem. IlOtum talis determ.inata. speoies transteratur a potentia 
oonservante ad apprehendentem. Quomodo autem potest trans-
mittl i11a species a potentia eonservante, 81 non oognoscit 
aut disoernit quaenam species transmlttenda sit ad talem 
e:x:oitatlonem?2., 
Sinoe the species must be used to bring about the eXcltation, re-
call must take place in the power which has the species in its 
2SS.~. ~ !a., 13 o. 




posseasion. The apprehensive powers do not sto~ species; there-
fore recall is not their proper function. Reoall properly belongs 
to the powers whioh retain and these in the sense psychology of 
St. Thomas are memory and imaginatIon. 
Now, the question arises: is the reoall or sense memory dis-
tinot from the reoall ot imagination? 
It seou that aocor4Ing to St. Thomas they are distinot. 
Speaking in the third lecture ot the In De Memoria et Reminisoen-
.............. ......... I 
1!! of the different tormalities under which imagination and sense 
memory attain their Objects, St. Thomas uses the word oonvert1t !! 
[anIma] which suggests the idea ot reoal1. And there are two such 
recalls or "turnIngs" of the soul: "[Q]uando anima convertit se 
ad phantasma, prout est quaedam torma reservata 1n parte sensitlva, 
sio eat actus 1magination1s sive phantas1ae. •• 51 autem anima 
convertatur ad Ipsum Inquantum est imago eius quod prius audlvimus 
aut intel1ex1mus, hoc pertinet ad actum memorandi. ft28 When the 
soul turns to the phantasm under the aspect ot 1ts being a repre-
sentation of sensible forms, then th1's turning 1s an aot of imagi-
nation. But when 1t turns into the phantasm under the aspect ot 
its be1ng a representation of our previous experienoe, then it 1s 
aa aot ot sense memory. The differenoe of acts is ultimately ex-
plained by the d1fference of formal objects, which for imagination 
is a sens1ble torm. as absent, and tor sense memory an insensate 
• 41 
intention aa abaent. 
Does St. Thomas ever speak ot reJl'l1n1scence as a separate 
power distinct trom sense memory1 
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In the Summa, I, 78, 4 ob. 5. he conslders the poss1billty ot 
positlng reminiscence as a separate power. ae says: 
Praeterea, actus cogltatlvae, qui est oonferre et co~ 
ponere et divldere, et actusreminlsc1tlvae, qu1 est quodam 
aylloglsmo uti ad lnqulrendum, non minus dlstant ab actu 
aastlntativae et memorative.e,quam. actus aest1mativ&.e ab actu 
phantastae. Debent ergo vel cogitative. et reminlscentia 
pon! aliae vire. praeter aeatlmatlvam et memoratlva.m.; vel 
aeattmatlva et memorative. non debent pont aliae vires prae-
tel'" phantaalam. 
Reminiscence, because ot the guldance received trom the intellect, 
1s so ditterent from other internal senses, that it seems to be 
reasonable to have lt as Ii separate power distlnct trom other In-
ternal senses. st. Thomas answers the objectlon ln the tollowing 
way: "Ad qu1ntum dieendum quod illam eminentlam habet cogitatlva 
et memorativa ln homlne, non per 14 quod est proprium aensltiv.e 
partls; sed per allquam attlnltatem et propinqultatem ad rationem 
universa1em.. secundum quandam retluentiam. Et ideo non sunt a11a. 
vires, sed eaedem, pertectlores quam sint in a1ils animalibus."29 
The oogitative sense and reminiscenoe are the powers in man with 
a certain excellence which the brutes laok. But as far as they 
are powers ot sense, they do not differ trom the estimative and 
the memoratlve faculties in man. Henoe, they are not new powers 
added to the soul of man, but are elevated on aocount ot the more 
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perfect informing principle whiah 1s the rational soul, whioh, 
throUgh its rational power, can .uae thom in a rational way. 
John at st. Thomas has this to sayan the point: 
Sequ11iur tertia cogi tatl.vam et reminiaoentiam in homine 
non dlstingul ab aestimativa et memoria, sed ease ipsamet 
potential cum quadam pertectione participata ex con1unotlone 
ad rationem, secundum quam disourrere possunt circa sua ob-
iecta singularIa, quod quidem pertinet ad 4iversum modum 0-
perandI, non ad diversam potantlam, quae solum ex diversa 
tmmateria11tate obieoti dlversificatur per se. ODd. eadem 
potentia intellectus procedlt et sine disaursu in actibus 
primorum prlncipiorum, at cum d1scursu in a1iis sine vari-
atione potentiae, et appetitus sensitivus in nobis participat 
aliquid llbertatiS, ut docet D. Thomas in 1. 2. q. 74. art_ ), et tamen non est alia potentia specie divers a ab appetltu 
sensltlvo nonhabente talem. llbertatem..30 
The parallel powers--the cogitative and the estimative sense, and 
reminiscence and memor7-are not distinct potencies, tor potencies 
are divel'sitled accord.ing to the difterences in theltt formal ob-
jects. Mere difference of operations does not divettsif1 the 
powers. Thus, tor example, we have various types of intellectual 
operation, and yet only one intellect. 
Both sense memory and reminiscenoe have the same tormal ob-
jects. In thIs they are not distinot. What is difterent 1n them 
is their manner of operating. Pure sense memory attains its ob-
ject without the aldot reason, while reminisoence attains it with 
the guidance ot syllogistio interence. But this guidance is not 
essential to memory as such. It is accidental. And therefore the 
differenee between them. is in the accidental order. As sense 
300ursus Philosoehlcua ~hom1stioU8, p. IV, q. 8, a. 2; p_ 257 
8) 
powers reminiscence and aense memory do not ditter, and hence St. 
Thomas concludes: nEt ideo non sunt a11ae v1res, sed eaedem, per-
tect10res quam sint 1n allis animallbus. u31 
However, the name "reminiscence" is sometimes used to denote 
the power ot sense memory in man, Just as the cogitative Is used 
to denote the estimative In man. 
Cajetan, oommenting on St. Thomas explaIns thIs thus: "Con-
venientla est in aetione senauum respeetu senslbll1um: et eius 
ratl0 est similiter tmmutarl ab els. -DIfferentia est in aetlo1:'le 
re.spectu Intentlonum: et quoad apprehensivam, quia cetera instlnc-
tu, homo collatIon. apprehendit; et quoad retentivam, quia cetera 
aublta reoordatione, homo inquisitivo dIsc~su. Und. et nOminibus 
etiam dlfterunt, dum ll10rum aestimativa in nobis eat oosltatlva.1 
et memoratlva est ~m1n\8~entia.ft32 The cogitative and the memor-
atlve powers in man are different from the oorresponding powers 
in animals by reason ot their association with the intellect. 
Hence, we are justified 1n calling them by dlffe~.nt names. Thus, 
the memorative power 1n man may be called ~.miniscence, just as 
the estimative in man is called the cogitatIve. In this sense ~e­
mini8cenee i8 a faculty, not a mere function of a faculty. But 
this, of course, does not mean that reminiscence i8 a new memora-
31~.!., I, 78, 4. ad 5. 
32~n !_!., I. 78, 4, VII, 
Omn:ta t cwil conun.entarlis Thomae (188~JI p. 257. 
in Sanctl ThoWje Agu1natls ~erV 
de vIo Caietan , O.p. (Romae, , 
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tlve potencY' which 1s distinct trom the sense memory in man. It 
is just a dirterent name for the same thing. There i6 only one 
memorative power in man whioh is the sense memory and whloh some-
times 1s oalled reminiscence. 
More properly, however, reminiscence meallS the act ot recall, 
rather than the potency. It 1s one of the functions of the memor-
ative power proper to man. This ca.n be seen from the definitions 
st. Thomas gives of reminisoenoe, as, tor instance, in the com-
mentary on the Q! Memoria !! ~eminiscentia: "[Rlemin1soentla nil 
est aliud quam inquisltio aliouius quod a memoria excidlt";33 and 
again: "[R]eminisoentia est resumptio primae acceptionls. n34 Re-
miniscence 1s the act by whioh we recall forgotten things. 
The function ot recall--either the d1soursive recall, whioh 
1s reminisoence, or the nondlsours1ve. whlch 1s the simple re-
0&11--18 necessary to memory, beoause without it the mere reten-
tion ot apeoles would be useless. However, recall is not lS! 
act ot memory. It is only the way to a still higher act. which 
is the actual remembering or reoognition: "[R]eminlseentia est 
via ad aliquid memorandum. n35 The act of recall is the functIon 
of sense memory which, having proceeded from the speoies retained 
in memory, oulminates in the act of reoognition. The final step 
33In De Mem. et Rem •• 5, n. 362. 
--- .................... ---~
34Ib1~., 4, n • .356. 
35~ld., 4, n. 357. 
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in the memorative pz-oaaas is reoognition. This completes the 
m.ovem.ent of memory, for here the sentient being recogniz.es the 
past as past. The next chapter w111 be devoted to the presenta-
tion of what st. Thomas understands by recognition. 
CHAP'l'ER V I 
THE FUNCTIONS OF SENSE MEMORY: RECOGNITION 
'fhe ability to recognize 1s the most distinctive feature of 
sense memory. From. experience we know that animals oan recognize 
objeots and events which have occurred in their past; for instance 
dogs recognise their masters. Suoh recognition involves first 01.' 
all the retention 01.' the images at the past experience, seoondly, 
the actual :reoall at these images, and thix-dly, a concx-ete know-
ledge at the image as at a past experience. The bare retentIon 
and recall does not formally constitute an act 01.' memox-y although 
they are necessary steps in the prooess. It is rather the aware-
ness that the recalled experience 1s a part ot onets oym past 
which differentiates memo!"y tram the other internal senses and 
gives it its exoellenoe and worth. "[M]emoria dlstlngu1tur pex-
hoc quod est praeterltorum inquantum praeterita aunt," says St. 
Thomas in the commentary on Aristotle's £! Sensu !! Sensato. l 
Thl'tough the function of reoognition a.nse memory has the 
power to know that a oertain object or event has been met in the 
past. In the ~umma St. Thomas says: ft[U)emoria est via apprehen-
lIn De Sensu et Senaato, 1, n. 9 • 
............. . ....... --~ ......... 
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siva praeterlti";2 and again: "Memoria 19itur est cognoscltlva 
alicu1us sub determinato tempore.") In the De Veri tate: "(M}emor-
- ................................ 
ia secundum communem usum loquentium aocipitur pro notitia prae-
terltorum.,,4 The abIlIty otsense memory to put the image in its 
proper historloal setting is the objeot of inquiry of the present 
chapter. 
One of St. Thomas' key statements on how recognitlon takes 
place is found at the end of the seventh leoture of the In De Me-
---
morla !! Reminiscentia. There St. Thomas says: "[Q]uando in anima 
slmu1 occurrlt motus rel memorandae et temporis praeterltl, tune 
est memorlae actus. aS One actually remembers only when two con-
dltlons are fulfllled Simultaneously: flrst, the movement of the 
object ot memory into consclousness, which is the ldentiflcation 
of the objeot as our own experience; and second, the corresponding 
movement of the time 1n which the ob ject has been apprehended. 
which is the "dating" or the placing ot the objeot in past time. 
It one ot these condltions is not verified, the act ot remembering 
does not take place. On this St. Thomas says: 
. " 
S1 vero aliquis putet ita se habere, et non ita fiat in memo-
~ia, quia vel deest mot us rei, vel motus tempo~is. non est 
memoratum. Nihil eDim prohibet quod in memore inait menda-
2~.!., III. 8S, 4 ad ). 
'Ibid., I, 79, 6, ob. 2. 
4~ !!t., 10, 2 0 (init.). 
SIn De Mem. at Rem., 7. n. 396 • 
.......................... ...-. ............ 
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olum, sicut oum alicui videtur quod memox-etur et non memora-
tur, quia occurrit ai tempus praeteritum, sed non res quam 
vidIt, sed alia loco 8iu8. Et quandoque aliquis memoratur 
et non putat se memorari: sed latet Ipsum, quia scilicet 
non occurr1t e1 tempus, sed res, qu1a, ut supra dictum. est, 
hoc est memorari, phantasmati intendere alicuius rei prout 
est imago prius apprehenal. Unde 8i motus rei tiat sine 
motu tempori8, aut e converso, non remini8citur. O 
One ~ be mistaken and think that he remembers when he really 
does not. This happens on aooount of the faot that either one or 
the other ot two conditions is not fulfilled. If one knows the 
object without knowing the time, or if he knows the time without 
knowing the Object, in either case he does not place an act of 
real remembering. In order to have reoognition he must oomb1ne 
the two elements 1nto one act. 
Identifioation of the objeot of memory as our own experience 
and placIng ot this object in its proper past time are two idea. 
which 8eem to be basic in st. Thomas' doctrine on recognition. 
Both ot them, however, need further explanation and textual de-
velopment. The present chapter, then, will be divided Into two 
parts, corresponding to the two ideas to be explained: first, the 
identIfication of the object, then the placing of it in the past 
time. 
The identifioation of the objeot as our own experience takes 
plaoe" according to st. Thomas" in the act in which the soul turns 
to the phantasm under the aspect ot an image. This image is not 
the pure image of the imagination, but the recognized image of 
6Ibld• 
memory. And so st. Thomas says in the paz-a graph quoted above: 
"[aloc est memorari, phantasmatl intenders aliculus re1prou.t est 
imago prius apprehensi. n7 The same idea 18 repeated in other 
similar expressions. To quote a few ot them: "S1 autal'll anima con-
vertat~ ad ipSUM, 1nquantum est imago eius quod prius audlvtmus 
aut intellex1mus, hoo partinet ad actum. memorand1; n8 "Secundum 
vero quod est phantasma a.lter1us quod prius sensimus vel lntel-
leximus, sic consideratur ut imago in aliud duo ens at principium 
memorandl. ft9 
As the distinction between the phantasm as an image and the 
phantasm as a s ausible form has been explained before f there 1s 
no need to go into it here. At this plaoe, however, another point 
should be brought out. Attention must be called to the faot that, 
whenever St .. Thomas speaks of the phantasm as an 1mage of.' our ex-
perienoe, he always adds some phrase Which indioates the part 
played by the knowing subject in the ident1fication of the phan-
tasm as an image of our own exper1ence. The words to note are 
"imago prIus a2ErehensI,n nquod prius auq1Y~ aut 1,ntellex1DM~.ft 
In the first lecture of the In De Memoria at Reminiscent!a St. 
- - - --'""""------
Thomas brings out the involvement at self even more clearly. He 
S&7'H "Semper en!m cum anima memoratur, prontmciat.!! vel prius 
8Ib1d., 3, n. 343. 
9!bid., ), n • .340. 
90 
audivisse aliqu1d vel sensisse vel intellex1sse. n10 The two 
----_.----. • $ 
ideas, namely, the image of our e;q>erience, and the knowled.ge 
tha.t this image is, or that it has been, our expel"1enoe, are a1-
-
ways oonnected together. In this St. Thomas shows that the know-
ledge ot selt 1s essential 1n the identification ot an objeot as 
our own experience. 
In order to identity an objeot or an event as a part of the 
subject's own past, he must have some advertenoe to himself. He 
must know that he 1s the subject who has experienced that object 
or event previously and who now reoalls it to oonsciousness. 
There can be no recognition of the past without a concrete know-
ledge that the subjeot himself tormerly existed, that he was then 
the same individual as he is now. 
It is evident that the tullness of the knowledge of the ego 
is possible only to the intellect, which has the power of proper 
reflection. The animal, however, has some knowledge ot its own 
ego, too, but only improperly. In the dootrine or St. Thomas 
this function 1s performed by the common sense. St. Thomas admits 
that the sentient beings have an imprope~ ~et1ect1on, which, as 
oont~aated '111 th the intelleot t s complete return to 1 tsal!, has 
only incomplete return; 1.e •• it knows the senslble objeots, and 
knows that it know. but does not know ita own essence. ll Through 
10Ibi~., 1, n. 307; italics added. 
llDe v~~ •• 1, 9 o. 
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the subjective unifying funotion of the common sense even the 
. . 
animal has some knowledge of :tts O\'ffi ego. 
Father Edmund Ryan in his dissertation entitled The Role of 
---
~ tSens'1s Communis' !!2 ~ ps:ohol.o€~ E!. a. Thomas Asu1nas ex-
plains bI'iefly St. Thomas' theory on the unifying power of the 
oommon sense. Parts of this explanation can be reoounted here. 
In the ohapter called "A Synthesis of St. Thomas' Position on the 
fS.ns~s commun~st," he says: 
From the proper object ot the sensus cOllltllunis, there 
flows .. twofold unification exemp11fIed In tEe proper oper ... 
ationa of the common sense: a) the awa.reneS8 of the aotions 
01' the external •• nses and t'fU.ougb. this b) the pereaption of 
the aets of the proper sensibles otthe ?tve external senses. 
In the theo17 ot st. Thomas., the common sense possesses a 
knowledge of the sensations of the external senses; it et-
tecta a d1scriminat1on ot these sensations; it ach1eves a 
fJ'ynthesis of the sensations.. • .. 
The tirst unifioation brought about by the common sense 
is subjective--the concrete and implic1t perception 01' the 
subject himaelt which occurs ooncomitantly w1th the percep-
tion ot the object. The first purpose ot the common sense 
1s to give to the individual consciousness ot the acts 01' 
his external senses. For this reason the sensus Qommunis is 
oalled sensitive consoiousness or the intim.ate sense .. 
Through the sensus oommunis I am aware that I am seeing and 
that I am hearrng ana tlia'E this 1s one and. the same sensing 
subject. Since the aot ot one extex-nal sense is different 
trom the acts ot the other external senses, to be attributed 
to the same tIt they must be united. It is the common senae 
whioh recognizes these acts ot the external senses as my 
operations; it reoognizes these as acts of the same subjeot. 
Thus the common sense 18 aware at the operations of the ex· 
tarnal senses and disoriminates among them, attributing oer-
tain moditioations to certain per1pheral organs. • •• It 
should be olearly understood, however, that the .ommon sense 
does not reach the permanent subject abstractly or expllclt17 
that is, as dist1not trom the sensations. Consequently, the 
oommon senae 1s primarily aon.cerned in a concrete and aen-
tient way w1th the acts ot the external senaes which are the 
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basis tor the awareness of the subject's own existenoe and 
unlty.l2 
The unity ot self on the sense plane is known, in the theory of 
St. Thomas, through the function of the oommon sense. The animals 
do not have an abstraot knowledge ot their own ego as do men. But 
they have a conorete awareness that the sensations whioh they are 
having are theirs. It is they who tee1 this pain or experienoe 
this pleasure or see this object. The unifying sense thus ae~ 
counts, even in animals, tor the permanence of the ego, the know-
ledge of which is essential tor the identifioation of present 
peroeption as having been experienced at somet1me 1n the past. 
But now a still further question has to be asked. How does 
the identification of the reoa1led phantasm with previous experl-
" 
enc. take place in the knowing subject? Acoording to st. Thomas, 
a. has been po1nted out, the identification of the objeot ot mem-
ory is the reeognition ot the phantasm as an image ot our previous 
experience. 
There are three ways in which a man oan identity hi s own ex-
perience in the phantasm. Two of them are false, one 1s true. In 
the thIrd lectm-e of the In De Memoria et Reminisoentia St. Thomas 
................ ,........ . .. 
desoribes three types ot remembering; the fIrst is had when we 
doubt whethe~ we remember; the seoond, when we really and properly 
• 
12Edmund Joseph R7an, C.PP.S., The Role of the 'Sensus Co~ 
m'¥lis f .!a!8! P.slcholog,r p.!!!. ~homas Aquinas, pp. lli(J:j •. -
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remember; and the tll1rd, when we think that we remember but reall,. 
do not. 
The reason why we sometimes doubt about our msmory is the 
tact that we are not sure whether the recalled Image really re-
ters to our actual experienoe. st. Thomas says: "Aliquando enim 
quamvis 1n nobis sint lI10tus phantasmatum qui Bunt taoti ab eo quod 
aenaimus, qui scilicet relinquuntur ex prima immutatlone sensus 
propri! a .ensibili, tamen nesoimus si accidat hoc motus esse in 
nob18 secundum hoo quod prlus sensImu.s aliquid. Et ideo dubita-
mu.s utrum memoremur vel non. tt13 Even though the phantasm 1s 
trulY' representative of our actual experienoe, :ret, it .. e do not 
know it as suoh, the identification of the image does not take 
place. For real identifioation two conditions have to be ful-
filled: the phantasm must be a representation of our ownexpel'i-, 
enoe and it must be known by us as suoh a, representation. 
In the third kind of remembering (whioh 1s also false), it 
happens the othel' way around. Here in turning to the phantasm 
which does not reter to our past, we think that it does l'8ter to 
it. This happens because we mistake the image ot imagination to 
be an image of memo17'. and hence we have a talse identittcatlon.14 
To remember properly. and theretore to have a true identifi-
oation ot the phantas~ one has both to experienoe an image ot the 
13l!! £!. Mem • .!! R,e~., ), ni 345. 
14l';bld., 3, n. 347. 
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real past and to know that it is an 1mage 01' the real past. St. 
Thomas describes it in the following way: "Secundo vero oont1ng1t 
a11quando quod hoc intelligit at remin1scitur, quia prius aud1vi-
mua aut vidimus aliquid Quiua pbantasma tunc nobis occurrit, quod 
est proprie memorar1: et hoc contingit quando ll1e qui apeculatur 
phantasma movetur quidem ab ipso praesenti phantasmate, sed con-
alderat 1p8um inquantum est imago alteriuB, quod prius senstt vel 
intelle.x1 t. nl$ He who remembers truly knows in the phantasm the 
image o£ bis previous experience. Tbia identification of the 
phantasm takes place in the act by which the soul turns to it and 
knows lt a.s a repl*esentatlon 01' a definite experience, not merel,. 
experiences in general, ot lts own past. Thus, the phantasm, even 
though it 119 present, nevertheless in v1l*tue of its belng an image 
ot previous experience, represents the real past o£ the knoWing 
subjeot. 
This, it would seem, 1s St. Thomas' idea of how tne ao~called 
motga rei or the identification ot the objeot 01' memory i8 to be 
explained. 
But the ldentification of the obJeot Is only a part ot the 
process ot recognition. Atter the image has been identIfied as 
one's own experience, it must--ln order to be tully recogni~ed-­
be situated in lts proper historical time. This 1s the other part 
of the aot of recognition which has been oalled by St. Thomas 
l$Ibld., 3. n. 346. 
-
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motus tel1porls, or the movement of the soul to know the time in 
which the object occ~red to us in the past. 
St. Thomas expresses himself on the question of the motus 
tePm0ris in various ways. Relevant statements can be found in the 
commentaries as well as in original works. Unfortunately, most ot 
these statements are only fragmentary. They give the theory in 
amall portions, never pretending to pl"esent it :1n any oomprehen-
sive faShion. Oonsequently. the understanding of St. Thomas' mind 
in this matter is rather diffioult. In the following pages an 
attempt will be made to collect the more important passages in 
one place,to unity them, and in doing so to give an interpreta-
tion of st. Thomas f thought. Where the eV14ence will be lacking, 
it will be necessary to conjeoture what that thought would be. 
That sense memory implies some knowledge of time is clear 
from the tact that ~mory is a power Which apprehends the past. 
Hence, in the Summa St. Thomas says: "{Mlemoria praeteritorum. est. 
Sed praeteritum dlcltur seoundum aliquod determinatum tempus. 
Memoria igltur est COgDOscltlva &liouius sub determinatotempo-
re."16 It memory is able to know the past, it must be able in 
some way to sense time. 
Time is defined by St. Thomas as "'numerus motu.! secundum. 
prius et posterius.",17 In 1ts conoept time involves notions ot 
16~.!., I, 19, 6, ob. 2. 
17Ibdd., I, 10, 1 c. 
-
number, motion. and relntion between ordered parts. To know 
these notions and these relations as such. one needs the opera-
tion of the intellect, for only the intellect can apprehend re-
lations as such. Sinoe sense memory is not an intellectu.a.l powor, 
it does not know time abstrac tly, i. e .. I 'U.I.'4derstanding the nature , 
of number, of suocession, etc. However, it can know it conoretely. 
Commenting on Aristotle's £! Memoria .tl. Heminiscontia st. 
Thomas shows that magnitude, motion, and time are known by the 
faculties of sense. In the second leoture he says: 
[N]eeesse est quod eadem parte animae cognoscitur magnitudo 
et matus, qua etiam cognoscitur tempus. • • • 
Magnituda autem oognoscitur sensu: est en1m unum de 
sensibilibus communi bus. Similiter autem et motus, prae-
cipue Ioealis, oognoscitur. inquantum oognoscitur distantia 
magnltudinis. Tempus autem cognosoitur, inquantum cognos-
e1tur prius at posterlus In motu: unde et etiam sensu per-
aip! possunt. Duplleiter autem aliquid sensu peroipltur. 
Uno quldem modo per ipsam immutationem sensus a sensibl11; 
et sic eognosountur tam sensibilia proprIa quam etiam co~ 
munia a .enaibua proprIis et a sensu communi. Alio modo 
cognoscitur allquid quodam. secundarl0 motu" qui re11nquitur 
ex prima 1mm.utatlone sensus a aenalbili. QuI quidem motus 
remanet etlam quandoque post a.bsentlam sensibilium, et per-
tlnet ad pbantasl&m, ut babitum est in libro de Anima. Phan~ 
taaia. autem" seoundum quod apparet per huius Immuta£Ionem 
secundarlam, est paaaio sensus communis: sequitur enim. totam 
Immutationem sen ... , quae inolpit a sensibI1ibus propriIs, 
at terminatur ad sensum communem.Unde manitestum est quod 
praedicta tria, soilicet magnitudo, motus et tempus, seoundum 
quod aunt in 'Ohantasmate, comprehenduntur et cognoseuntur per 
sensum commun(l)lu.1B 
The important points made here are these: magnitude and motion are 
known by sense powers (not the intellect); time 1s apprehended by 
sense, tOOl It is known Inaamucb as succession in motion can be 
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known; sense can perceive in two ways-hy the actual impression or 
the sensible upon the sense potencies, and by the species which 
remain in the sense powers after the sensible objects have been 
removod; the sensible :forms are retained in the phantasy, which is 
an affection (a mod.ification) of the sens1.l~ eomr.lunis; lllag;nitude, 
motion, and time are retained in the phantasm and are known by 
the oommon senss. 
How does sense memory come in here? St. Thomas brings it in 
in the next paragl"Jph. ReNt he distinguishes between the intel-
leotual and senae memory. But he also points out how memory a1'-
pItehends time. First of all, it knows time in the phantasm: "Sen-
sibilia enim postquam praetereunt, a sensu non percipiuntUl~, nisi 
siou.t in phantasmate"J 19 secondly, it appreh.ends it a.ccording to 
a deteItmined distance which is 111easured i'rom the previous impres-
sion to the present moment: "[A}d memoriam autem peIttinet appre-
h$nsio temporls seoundum dete~lnat1onem quamdam, seoundum. soilicet 
dlstantlam in pItaesenti nuno. n20 
A somewhat more detailed exposition of the knowledge of time 
1s found in the seventh lecture of the In De Memoria at RemiIlis-
.................. -.. ....................... 
centia. Here St. Thomas shows how the various magnitudes, includ-
ing the temporal distanees, are perceived. 
It must be presupposed, he ways in the seventh lecture, that 





the~e is something in us by which we distInguish between greater 
and lesser periods ot time. 21 How do we do it? It is reasonable 
to think, says St. Thomas, that we distingu1sh the various dis-
tanoes of time in the same way 1n which we discriminate spatial 
magnitudes: "Et hoc rationabile est esse circa tempus, sicut et 
circa magnitudlnes corporales: magnas qu1dem, quantum ad quanti-
tatem corporum viscrum, at procul,.quantum ad quantltatem distan-
tlae 10ca11s, cuI proportlona~ur quantitas temporls,quae accIpi-
tur secundum distantiam a p~a.sentl nuno. n22 This knowledge ot 
size. and distances 1s not a product ot our thought reach1ng out 
to them, but i8 a psychlc prooess by whiohwe know external ob-
jects through their species lett In the soul: "Non ergo cognoscit 
anima magn1tudinem .i se coextendendo, sed per hoc, quod qui4am 
motu. a re senalbl1i resolutus in anima, est proportionalis mag-
nitudin! exterior!. Sunt 8n1m in anima quaedam formae et motus 
a1m11es rebus, per quas res cognosclt."23 Magnitude. have their 
representations in the intentional order, and hence can be known 
by means ot these rep~e8.ntat1ons. 
Atter this St. Thomas asks a question: "Cum an1ma pe~ simili-
tudinem. magnltud1111a quam. habet magrdtudlnem. cognoscat, 1n quo 
21IbiS., 7, n. 387. 
22Ibid• 
23~id •• 7, n. 388. 
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dlttert 111ud quo cognosolt malorem et mlnorem magn1tudlnem?~ 
And he answerst 
(A]nlma vel per slmilem f1guram siva tormam 1ntelllg1t min-
ora, ldest minorem quant1tatem, sieut et per formam s1milem 
cognosclt m.aloItem magnltudlnem. Formae enim et Motus lnteIti-
ores proportlonallter correspondent magnltudln1bus exteri-
oribua, et to~te ita est de magnitudlnlbus sive distantiis 
looo~ et temporum, sicut de speciebus rerum. Unde, slout 
in ipso oognoscente aunt d1versa. slm1l1tudines et motus 
proportionaliter respondentes dlversls speoiebus re~um, puta 
equo et boY!, Ita etiam et dlversis quantitatIbus. 2/ 
The point here, it would seem, is that temporal distanoes, and 
even the differences between greater and lesser distances, are 
known 1n the same way as the magnitudes ot bodies, i.e., through 
the torms whioh are impressed on the soul by those magnitudes. 
Through the torms and motions which remain 1n the soul we know 
not merely the varIous sizes ot exte~al things, but perhaps (I) 
also the magnitudes ot apatial and temporal distances. 
Cajetan commenting on the passage or the Summa in which St. 
Thomas deals with the virtue or hope, says that bItutes do not 
have hope because the1cannot perceive future time. Sense powers 
know time only by imp~esslonJ and impression can be had or past 
time, not or the future. He says: 
Et quonlam. non a11 ter per"c.1pl tur tempus a parte sensi tl va 
nisi per Immutatlonem, ideo futurum ~epugnat perceptioni 
sensItlvae. Cumenlm tempus sIt numerus motus secundum prIus 
at posterlus, non alIter peroipitur sensu tempus, nisi per-
24ibld., 7, n. 389. 
25Ib1d., 7, n. 390. 
-
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clplendo quandam distantiam suooessivam ab 111a mutation. us-
que ad 111am: at sic, depiot! in parte sensitiva hac at illa 
mutationa, perolpltur tempus. Propter quod, il11us tantum 
temporis praeteriti meminimus, culua 1mmutatl0 aliqua de-
piata retinetur.20 
Cajetan conoludes that Sense powers percelve only that t1me ;vlUah 
leaves an iDlPNSslon on the soul. This cannot be future, but only 
past. In th1s qao:b8.tion Cajetan brings out a point whIch has to 
be conslde~ed next. He says that the temporal dlstance whioh ani-
mals perceive 1s successive. ~he succession consists in going 
trom one impression to another. 
From. the definit10n of time as given by St. Thomas, lt ls 
clearthat auecesaion aoeording to sequence is essential to the 
notion ot t1me, and hence in order to know time, one has to know 
the succession in mot-ion. On this point St. Thomas says in the 
Summa: "Cum en1m. in quollbet motu sit auceessio, .t una pars post 
alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterlus in motu, appre-
hend.1m.us tempus ... 27 Therefore, it sense memory 1s to know time, 
1t must be aware ot some kind ot suocession extend1ng to the past, 
and must be able somehow to number the sucoeeding parts .• 
St. Thomas otten speaks o£ the memorrfs awaX'eness which ex-
tends 1 ts gaze tl:"ODl the "now· to the time when the remembered ob-
jeot has been first received. Thus, he says in the 2! Verltate: 
• 
26.!B 1.1., I-II, 40, )J v, 261-8. 
27§.!., I, 10, 1 c. 
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"[M]emor1a secundum propriam sui aocept1onem resplolat ad Id quod 
est praeteritum respeotu huius nuno"J 28 and again: "Philosophus 
loquitur de memoria quae est praeter1ti, prout est relatum ad hoo 
nuno, inquantum eat hoc."29 Memory. then, knows the past as 1 t 
related to the present or the "now." It is aware of a certain ex-
tension whloh spans the temporal distance from past e x.perience tp 
the present moment. How is the soul aware of this extension? 
this: 
In the commentary on Aristotle's Pgysiea St. Thomas expla1ns 
Oont1ngit 8n1m quandoque quod perclptmua tluxum temporis, 
q~ls nullum motum part1cularem aenalbl1em sentlamus; ut-
pote 81 a1mua in tenebrls, at al0 vlau non sentimus motum 
allcuiu8 corporis exterloris, et, a1 nos non patlamur all. 
quam alteratlonem 1n corporlbua nostr1s ab allquo exteriorl 
agente, nullum motam oorporia aentiem.ua; ettam&n al flat 
allquis motus in anima nostra, puts. seoundum successionem 
cogltationum et imaginatlonum, subito vldetur nobis quod 
flat allquod tempus. Et .ie pereiplendo quemcumque motum 
perolpimUs tempus; et similIter e contra cum perclp1mus 
tempus s1mul peroipimu8 motum.30 
Time 1s peroelved w1th any motion. And when we do not sense ex-
ternal movement but are aware of our intex-ior aots, we feel the 
successive motion of these acts, and hence we are able to know 
tims. The sucoession, then, is had in the $equence of the acts 
which are placed by the cognitIve being. Human beings, of oourse, 
28ne Ver •• 10, 2 c. 
-- . 
29Ibid., 10, 2 ad 2. 
-
.lOIn IV ~il~.' 17, n. 1099. Thomae Aquinatis, In Octo Libros 
De PHS!COAU U Slve Phi81corum Aristote11a aommen~~e(f. 
Ins- 0 I. P1rot'a,-o:1. ( eapoX!, !~5j'. p. ~j. 
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know this sequence in a more perfeot way than do animals. level'-
theless, animals too are oonscious of their own sensations. Inas-
muoh as they know the sucoession ot these sensations, they know a 
oonorete suooessive motion. And to be •• are ot suoh motion, as 
Cajetan well observes, is to know time. 
One tinal question remains to be answered: how is the past 
known as past? 
St. Thomas does not hesitate to affirm that sense memory 
knows the past as past. Thus in the J2! V .... ~e_r;;;..:i:;..;t_a ..... t_e he says: HOlJemo ... 
ria secundum communsm usum loquent1um aooipitur pro notitia prae-
teritorum. Cognosoere autem praeteritum ut praeteritum, est eius 
cuius est cognosoere praesens ut praesens, vel nuno ut nuno; hoc 
autem est sensus. H3l 
!!2! the past as past is known, st. Thomas never e:xplaina 
tully. The olosest that he oomes to an explanation ot this prob-
lem 1s, perhaps, the question in the Summa in which he inquires 
whether the intellectual ~mory can know past as past. Here he 
says something on sense memory also: 
[P)raetar1tl0 poteat ad duo r.terrl: scilicet ad obieotum 
quod oognoaoitur; et ad oognItion!. aotum. Quae quldem duo 
simul ooniunguntur in parte sensltlva, quae est apprehenslva 
a.11cuiu.s per hoo quod immutatm- a p~aesent! sena1b111: unde 
simul animal memoratur se prius sellaiase in praeten to et se 
a.nslsse quoddem praeterltum .enslbile. -Sed quantum ad 
partem intellectlvam pertlnet, praeterltl0 aooldit, et non 
per se oonvenit, ex parte obleot! intellectus. Intellig1t 
en1m intelleotus hominem, Inquantum est homo: homin! autem, 
31De Ver., 10, 2 o. 
--
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lnquantum est homo, accldlt vel in praesenti vel in prae-
terlto vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeterltio 
par se acelpi poteat etiam in Intellectu, sicut in sensu. Quia intelllgere animae nostrae est quldam particularls actus J in hoe vel in il10 tempore exlstens, secundum quod d!eitur 
homo intelllgere nunc vel her! vel o1'as.32 
In sense memory the oonditions of pastness may be referred to two 
things: the objects already experienced and also the acts by which 
those objects were apprehended. The intelleotual memory knows the 
past only in its aots. This is so beoause the condition of the 
past applies only to those things which can exist in a definite 
period ot time, The objeot of the intelleot Is not restrioted 
to a fixed time because it 1s universal, while the aot, since It 
1s individual, exists in a definite time, and therefore can refer 
to the past. 
In the body ot the same article St. Thomas says: "Si vero de 
ratione memoria. sIt quod stU$ oblectum s1t praeter1tum, at prae-
ter1tum, memorla in parte intelleot1va non er1t, sed .ena1t1va tan-
tum, quae est apprehens1va partlculuium. Praeteritum enim, ut 
praeter1tum, cum signitioat esae sub determinato tempore, ad oon-
dit10nem partioular1. pertlnet. uJ3 Individuals can pertain to 
the past because tney exist in a definite period ot time. 
But the questIon still remains. We know that Individual aots 
and individual objects can be in the past, and that they are known 
321_1_, I, 19. 6 ad 2. 
33Ibid •• I. 79. 6 o. 
-
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as past; but we also 'Would 11ke to know how they are known 4S 
-
past. 
As tar as it oan be ascertained, St. Thomas does not oonsider 
this question explioitly in his works. However, he does speak of 
it implicItly, when he explains in the first lecture of the lnR! 
Memoria at Rem1nlscentia that memory is not of the present but of ____ 11 
the past. lIe says: 1I0stand1t (Philosophus] quod memoria non est 
praeaantisJ sed hoc dicit pertinere ad sensum, paF q uom neque 
futurum, neque faotum, id est praeterltum, cognosoimus, sed tan-
tummodo praeaens. n34 And he proves this trom the common manner 
of speaking: 
Et hoa probat ex comm.un1 usu loquentlum. Cum enim aliquld 
praesentiallter adest, puta cum aliquis praesentla11ter 
v1det album, nullus dtoeret se memorar1album: siout nullu8 
dicit se memorari ilIud, quod per intellect·um actu cons1dera-
tur, cum actu conalderat at 1ntelllg1t: sed cum communiter 
homines vident album, nominant sent1re; et oonsiderare ali-
quid actu .. nominat 8Olummodo scire. Cum aIlquis autem habet 
acientiam habltualem at potent1am 8 ensitlva.m sine actibus vel 
operation1bus eorum, tunc dloitur mamorar1 praeteritorum 
aotuum. • •• Semper 8n1m oum anima memoratur, pronunoiat 
se val~rlua audlvisse allquld, vel sensisse, vel Intelle~ 
ls8e.3.5 
When we see a white objeot, we do not say that we remember it; we 
say that we see it. In order to identIty something as past, one 
must be con.cious that he does not sense those things in the pre-
sent. How is this aooomplished? It may be supposed that a Sen-
35Ibid., 1, n. 307. 
-
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tient being distinguishes between the present and the past by exer-
oising different powers. It knows the present by its common sense. 
a ammon sense is the power by whioh one knows _one f s own senSing and 
the unity of one'. experience in the present.36 When this power 
is at work: we know that we are sensing something present, as when 
we see something white. But when we sense an object without the 
operation ot the common sense, we know that what we experience is 
not the pre.ent. The relatlonship with the operation of common 
.en.e establishes the apprehension of the present. When this re-
latlonahip is lacking, we know that we are aware of something past 
01' at least at somethlng absent. This ls, perhaps, what st. Tho-
mas bas in mind when he 8ays in.Q!. Vex-it&te: U[M]emoria secundum 
proprlam sui acoeptionem respiciat ad ld quod est praeteritum res-
pectu huius nunc"J 37 and again: "Phi1osophus loquitur de memorla 
quae est praeterltl. prout .at relatum ad hoc nunc, inquantum est 
hoc.,,38 
But this, one might say, gives only a general and indefinite 
notion ot the past. I remember that this happened to me sometime 
in the past, but I do not know exaot17 when. From experience .e 
know, however, that we can remember with greater precision than 
this vague "collection. On this St. Thomas says: 
36!_!., I, 78, 4 o. 
37De Ver., 10, 2 o. 
--3a~., 10, 2 ad 2. 
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Quandoque enim allqu18 recordatur tempus non quldem sub certa 
D'1Etnsura, put. quod tertia dleteoerit aliquid. sed quod all-
quando fecit. Quandoque autem reoordatur sub"mensura tempo-
ri8 praeterltl, quamvls non sub cf;lrtamensura. Consueverunt 
en1m hominea dicere quod recordantur quidem allcuius roei ut 
praeterltae, sed nesciunt quando tuerlt, quia nesclunt tem-
poria metrum., i.est, mensuram: et hoo contlngi t proptex- de- . 
bl1em impresslonem, sieut contlnglt in"his quae vldentur a 
remotis, quae Indeterminata oognoseunt.39 
The oonditions ot memory are fulfilled it paetness is known inde-
terminatel,.. But tor a perfeot reoognition one must be able to 
place the objeot in the past acc~atel,.: tor instance, this hap-
pened to me three 447s ago. Row 1s this aocurate plaoing ot the 
object ot memory in tne past to be explained? 
Since the textual evidenoe is lacking, the &nswer must be 
attempted by oonjecturing. 
In the passage laat quoted st. Thomas says that the reason 
why we do not remember the date ot the remembered objects is that 
we do not know the measure ot time in which these objeots occurred 
It .e knew the measure ot time, tor instance, t~ee or tour days 
back, we could place the remembered object in its proper histori-
cal t1me, and hence we would have an aot ot perfect reoognition. 
!he explanation of how the mea.ure of time is known should be 
based, 1t would seem, on at least three fundamental ideas: the 
concrete awareness of self, the knowledge ot the succession ot 
past act., and the ability on the papt of the subject to dis-
tinguish between the aots whioh have been plaoed earlier from 
19lB ~ !!!!. !! !i!!!. t 7 t n. 397. 
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those which have been placed later in the sequence. 
In the theorr ot st. Thomas, as has been explained before, 
animals have awareness ot self through the knowledge ot their own 
acts and known Objects. This gives them a conorete knowledge ot 
their own permanent ego. But this ego in itself is not enough to 
enable them to know the past. They m.ust be able to focus their 
attention on the various manifestations ot this ego. 1.e .. , on the 
indIvidual acts Which reveal to them tneir consoious selt. St. 
Thomas says in the Summa that a sentient being knows its past 
acts and the objects apprehended in the past.40 These objects and 
these acts fo~ a sequence ot experience ot wbien Cajetan speaks 
In his commentary on the ~ummat in the passage which has been 
quoted earller. ExplainIng how sense powers know time, he says: 
n[N]on aliter perclpltur sensu tempus, nisi percipiendo quandam 
dlstantiam successlvam ab 111a mutatione usque ad illamt et Sic, 
depict! in parte sen81tlva hao et 111a mutatione, perclpltur 
tempus.-41 Sense powers pe»eelve tne sequence ot their acta and 
known objects in such a wa,. that they know one sensa.tion to ha.ve 
tollowed another. This g1ves them the knowledge ot suocessive 
motion whioh 1s necessary tor the knowledge ot time. 
It animals can distinguish one individual act from another, 
and It they know theae acts in a sequenoe, it seems that they 
40S • T., I, 19, 6 ad 2 • 
.... -- . -
41In 8.T., I-II, 40, 3. 
---
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should be able to distinguish an act expe~lenced earlier in the 
sequence from that experienced later, so that they can know the 
time in which this particular act was placed by reference to other 
acts which are prior or posterior to it. The general point of 
reterenoe is the present moment: W(M]emorla. • .eat praeterlti, 
prout est relatum ad hoo nuno. ft42 Having the general point of 
~eterenoe and being able to distinguish the prior aots in the 
sequence trom the posterior, the sentient being can place a re-
membered objeot acourately in its proper past time, thus putting 
it in a del"inite period of its oonscious existenoe.. In this way 
it can know a past object as past and can "dateD it more or less 
accurately in its past experienoe. 
When one identifies a recalled objeot as belonging to his 
own experience and when he plaoes it in its proper historical 
setting, he oan be said to have exercised an act of recognition 
proper to sense memo~. With the recognition ot an object as an 
experience ot: one's own past, one truly remembers and thus com-
plete. the process of sense memory. 




Toward the end ot his life St. Thomas contessed that be 
never torgot anything that he studied. No doubt, his memory was 
a prodigy 01' retention. It has been said that one or two readings 
were enough tor him to fix even lengthy material. l or oourse, 
muoh 01' tb.1s was a 81tt 01' nattU"e. But one t s native endowment oan 
atill be trained, so that 1t can attain even better results. St. 
Thomas has set tour rules tor the oultivation 01' good memory. The, 
al'e so simple and natural that one may easily overlook them. But 
they have ~eat practioal significance. A short oo~ntary on 
them will supplement the theory expounded in this thesis; and 
since the rules are based on some 01' the theoretical points, they 
will provide an oocasion to summarize st. Thomas' doctrine on 
•• nae memory and tnU8 be a fitting oonclusion to the present 
study. 
The to~ rules tor the oultivation ot a good memorr ~ round 
in the Summa:; II-II, 49. 1 ad 2. St. Thomas begins this pasaa.ge 
by saying that memory, even though it is a natUNll power of man, 
let. Robert Edward Bl"ennan, 0.1., General PSloholoQ, 2nd ed. 
(New York, 1952), p. 204. 
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nevertheless it can be pertected by art and practice. He 8aY8: 
"[Klemeria non solum a natura proticlscltur, sed etlam habet 
plurlmum artis et industriae. n2 And then he proceeds to give the 
tour rules, which are: (1) to search tor good illustrations, (2) 
to set in order the things to be memorlzed, el) to be eager to 
learn, and (4) frequently to refleot on that whieh one wishes to 
remember. 3 
The first rule reads as tollows: 
(p ]r1mum. .at ut eorum quae vult homo memorarl quasdam simili-
tudlnes a.aumat oonvenientes, nee tamen omnino consuetas: 
quia ea quae aunt Inconsueta magls m1ramur, et sic ln els 
animus magis et vehementius det1netur; ex quo t1 t quod sorum 
quae in puerltla vidtmus magls memoremur. Ideo autem n$ces-
sar1a est huiusmodl slm11itudinum vel lmaginum adlnventio, 
quia intentiones simplioes at splrituales t&0111us ex anima 
elabuntur nisi quibusdam slmilitudlnlbus oorporallbus quasi 
alligentur: quia humana cognltl0 potent lor est circa silnsi-
bilia. Unde et memorativa ponitur in parte sensitiva.4 
2!_!., II-II, 49, 1 ad 2. 
'Similar rules are tound also in the commentary on Arlstotl~. 
n. _ .. oria et Reminisoentl •• O(Ald bene memorandum vel reminiscen-
~, ex praimisais iijatuqi dooumenta utilia addiscere possumus. 
Quorum pr1l1lUm est, ut stu ea~ quae vult retlnere in allquem o1"di-
nem deducere. Secundo ut protunde et intent. eis mantem apponat. 
Tert10 \1t f'l'equen1ier med1 tetur sec\Uldum. oztdinem. Quarto ut inci-
pi at pem1n1sci a prinoipia." In De Hem. 8t Rem., 5, n. 371. 
1'h. fourth rule In this nsrlne.tt our-in the SWII1lA. It il 
replaced there by the rule which speaks ot the need or Illustra-
tions. The set ln the Summa seems tabe preferable to that ln the 
commentary, because the "fourth rule in the commentary which pre-
soribe. that one Is to begin x-emembering trom a prinoiple, seems 
to be inoluded in that whlch tells us to set things in order. It 
•• reoollect aooording to order, it would seem that we begin with 
an object which is the principle ot the order, and then proceed to 
reoall other objeots related ~o that principle, 
4~.I" II-II, 49, 1 ad 2. 
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Sensible illustrations and novel representations ~prove the pe-
tentlve power of mamory, because sense impressions do not slip 
away from us as easl17 as do objeots of thought. We seem to have 
a greater hold on corporeal objeots than on purely intellectual 
-. ideas. 'Henoe, to insUl"e la.sting retention, one has to tie down 
the intelligible speoies to sensible things by means of apt images 
and illustrations. The unoommon here is better than the oommon, 
sinoe examples with 80me freshness make a deeper impression. 
The faot that we are able to remember sensible objeots easier 
than non.enaibl. ones shows that memory is primarily a power ot 
sense. IfUnde at memorativa ponltur in parte aensltlva,tJ says st. 
Thomas. This brings to mind all the points that have been dis-
oussed in this thesis on memory as a faoulty ot internal sense. 
According to St. Thomas, memory proper ls in the sensitive part 
of the soul. It 1s an internal sense wboae proper object 1s the 
intentions of the estimative sense as absent. In the theory of 
St. ~homas, sen •• memory Is really distinct from the OOlml'lon sense. 
Imagination, and the estimative power. The distinctlon between 
these powers has been discussed in. the seoond chapter of the the-
ala. As a sense power, memory functions in the bodily organ which 
1s looated in the brain. The l'etentlve quality ot memory depends 
on the various dispositions of the organ, as tor instance on the 
amount ot water it oontains. That memory 1s a power mixed with 
matter can be proved also f rom the tact that it knows the past as 
~st. !here is no limitation to past, present, or tuture with the 
l-
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objeot ot the intellect, sinoe it is above the dimensions of space 
and time. Sense memory, like the l'est ot the senses, is concerned 
with the here-and-now aspects of things. The notion of pastness 
1s assooiated with matel'ial conditions, such as magnitude, d1s-
tance, and time. Henee, the 1000wledge of the past pl'operly be-
longs to the sensit1ve part of the soul, and consequently memory 
proper 1s a sense power, not an intellectual one. 
The seoond rule tor traIning of memoI'Y bids us to set 1n 
order those things which we want to remember. St. Thomas says: 
"Secundo,oportet ut homo ea quae memoriter vult tenere sua eon-
sideI'atione ordinate dlsponat, ut ex uno memorato taoile ad allud 
procedatur.,,5 
This rule is a practical application of what st. Thomas has 
said on the process of recall. The preserved images are linked 
together in our memory aocording to a certain pattern: like 1s 
linked with like, the unlike with its opposite, etc. These 
patterns are rete~red to as the law8 of association. They are 
the natural ways to recall forgotten objects w1th ease a.nd et-
.t1ciency. Henoe, it we want to acquire a ce~ta1n ease in recol-
lection, we have to set ln order things that we want to remember. 
Thls order estab11shetl log1oal connections between images, thus 
enabling reason to gulde our efforts to recapture the past. 
The third rule presc~ibes earnestness in reoelving the ~ 
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presaions: ttTertio, oportet ut homo sol1101tudinem apponat at 
affectum adhibet ad. ea quae vult memorari : quia quo a1iqu1d magis 
tuerlt impresaum animo, eo minus elabitur. n6 Eagerness or a real 
w111 to learn has the advantage ot making the mind well disposed 
to reoeive impressions.. And the more deeply an objeot ls impress8c 
on our me.Q~, the less liable it is to slip away. The result ls 
a more perfeot retention, and, 1n general, a better memo~. 
Although the reception of speoies is not oonsidered by St. 
Thomas as a proper function ot memory, nevertheless, it is pre-
supposed in the operations of this internal ~.nSe. The proper 
funotions ot memory are retention, recall, and x-ecognition.. Re-
oognition is the last step in the memoratlve process in whioh the 
image 1s identified as one's own experienoe and Is known as having 
occurred 1n the past. The aot ot reoeption 1s the basis tor these 
funotions ot senae memory, tor without the original reception of 
the speoies there oould be no retention, nor recall, nor reoog-
nition. Moreover, the quality ot reception determines to a large 
extent the quality ot the proper functions ot memory, especially 
that ot retention, as 1s suggested 1n the th1rd rule tor the cul-
tivation ot a good memory. 
Finally, in the fourth rule we are bidden to refleot otten on 
what we are t1'71ng to mELster: "Quarto, oportet quod sa trequenter 
medltemur quae volumus memorari. Unde PhI1osophu5 dIcit, in libro 
~ !!!., guod medltationes m.emoriam salvant: quia, ut in eodem 
libro dieitur, consyetsQo !!!guasi natura; unde quae multotles 
intelligimus olto ~em1nlscimur, quasi natural! quodam ordlne ab 
uno ad aliud procedentes."7 Frequent reflection preserves memory 
because it establishes custom, and oustom is, as it were, a se-
cond nature. The habits of memory are developed by many acts: 
ft[Elx frequent! actu memorandi hab1tus memorabilium contlrmatur," 
as st. Thomas says in the commentary on the .Q! Memoria .2! ~emlnl,s­
oentla. 8 , 
Memory as a hab! t has been explained in Chapter IV, on the 
act of retention. There the word "habit" was u.sed to mean the 
midstate between actuality and pure potency. Here this word has 
a different meaning. Those who have the ability to remember well 
are said to have a habit of good memory. Senae memory as a habit 
in this sense means a capacity or disposition to act well. 
Habits, in the theory of St. Thomas, are prImarily in the 
rational part of the soul.9 The sense powers cannot have habits, 
because in themselves and independently ot reason they are deter-
mined in their action by 8. sort of natural instinct. They lack 
that capacity for development whioh 1s needed for the growth of 
7Ibld.; references to Aristotle are Q! ~. !! ~., 1, 451 
a, 12-~and Ibid., 2, 452 a, 27-28. 
BIn De Mem. at Rem., 3, n. 348 • 
........................................... . 




Sense powera in man, however, have habits Inasmuchas they 
are oontrolled by reason. ll In this sense, sense memory 1s a 
habIt. st. Thomas says on this point: It[Iln ipsis Interlor1bas 
virlbus sensltlvis apprehensivls posalnt ponl allqul habItus, 
secundum quos homo fit bene memoratlvus vel cogitativus vel lma-
ginatlyus, • • • qula etlam istae vires movantur ad operandum ex 
impel"10 rationi •• ,,12 And again: 
[I]n vlr1bus 8ensItlvis apprehenaivls Interlus, ponuntur a11-
qui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praeoipue quod Phl1osophus 
dicit, in libro de MemorIa, quod in memorando unum Eost all-
,!:l9., ,oEeraturo coniUeiucto, ruae est"'!iu~Di guae'i!aiiliiitura: -
nIbi! auiem est arIu! nab tUB conlue u inaIIs quam haBitudo 
acquIs1ta per consuetudinem, quae est in modum. naturae. • • 
In homine tamen Id quod ex oonsuetud1ne acquirl tar In memor-
ia, et in allls viribus sensitivis apprehenslv1s, non est 
habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum habltibus intelleet1vae 
part1s.1J 
Sense memory is not a habIt properly so oalled, but something 
annexed to the habits or the intelleotive faoulty. By remembering 
one thing atter another, we beoome used to it. and thus rorm a 
habit of reoolleoting easily and effioiently. 
The rules for improving the memory having been oonsidered and 
a brier summary of the main ideas of the thesis having been pre. 




12Ib1d., I-II, 50, 3 ad 3. 
13~1d., 
Mem. et em .. , 
---
I-II, 56, 5 0; referenoe 
2, 452 a, 29-30. 
to Aristotle is to his De 
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sented, tho study of st. Thomas' teaching on sense memory may be 
broutnt to a conclusion. 
The purpose of the thesis was to present st. Thomas' dootrine 
On sense memory. As can be seen rro~ the titles of the chapters 
(sense memory as an internal sense, the object of sense ~emory, 
the functions of sense memory), only the fundaoental ideas on the 
topic have been considered. In order to get a oomprehensive view 
of st. Thomastthought on this internal sense, one should study 
related topios as well, such as, sense memory and mental life, 
its importance tOl' the building up of experience, the part it 
plays in.formine univorsals, its relation to the moral lifo, es-
pecially with the virtue of prudence, the problem of forgetful-
ness, etc. The questions that have been discussed in the present 
study oan and perhaps should be reoonsidered again, partioularly 
those which could be solved here only with probabIlity, as the 
distinotion between the functions of sense memory and those of 
imagination, and the knowledge ot the past as past. There 1s 
still much left to be done, both on the interpretation of St. 
Thomas and in the exploration of memory itself. 
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